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Abstract
This thesis consists of three substantive chapters, which explore topics related to the eco-
nomics of education. Two of the chapters examine teacher labour markets, and one chapter
examines the earnings of university graduates.
In Chapter 2, I create a new and unique dataset to examine how teacher characteris-
tics affect the probability of acquiring a permanent teaching position in the Ontario public
school system. This chapter provides evidence of how difficult it was for recent Ontario
teachers’ college graduates to obtain a teaching job. The odds of finding a position in 2006
were, on average, around four times higher than they were in 2013. Moreover, qualified
French-language teachers were, on average, three to five times more likely to find a job
than teachers without French-language qualifications.
In Chapter 3, I take advantage of restricted-access data to examine what is more im-
portant for earnings — the university that a student attends or the program that he or she
pursues. In particular, this chapter uses a method called relative-importance analysis, which
partitions the variation in earnings into program and school components and thus allows me
to determine the degree to which they affect earnings. The results show that there is more
variation in earnings across programs than schools. Programs account for between two and
eleven times the amount of variation in earnings than schools, depending on gender, degree
type and period since graduation.
In Chapter 4, I estimate the outside-option salaries of recent Ontario teachers’ college
graduates from the 2007 to 2013 graduating cohorts and compare them to teaching salaries
i
from the same cohorts. To do this, I create a new teacher salary dataset and combine it
with the data from the first two chapters. The results show that median teaching salaries
did not vary to any great extent across genders, cohorts and time periods since graduation.
However, the median outside-option salaries varied substantially across those same factors.
Moreover, the median teaching salaries were greater than outside-option salaries across
all factors. Also, despite there not being any gender differences in teaching salaries, the
outside-option median salaries were substantially greater for males than females.
Keywords: economics of education, returns to education, earnings analysis, labour
economics, teacher labour markets, applied microeconomics
ii
Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis consists of three substantive chapters, which explore topics related to the eco-
nomics of education. Two of the chapters examine teacher labour markets, and one chapter
examines the earnings of university graduates.
In Chapter 2, I create a new and unique dataset to provide evidence of how difficult it
was for recent Ontario teachers’ college graduates to obtain a teaching job. The odds of
finding a position in 2006 were, on average, around four times higher than they were in
2013. Moreover, qualified French-language teachers were, on average, three to five times
more likely to find a job than teachers without French-language qualifications.
In Chapter 3, I take advantage of data provided by the government to examine what
is more important for earnings — the university that a student attends or the program that
he or she pursues. In particular, this chapter uses methods that allow me to determine
the degree to which programs and schools affect earnings. Overall, the results show that
programs have a substantially greater effect on earnings than schools.
In Chapter 4, I estimate salaries of recent Ontario teachers’ college graduates from
the 2007 to 2013 graduating cohorts who did not acquire permanent teaching jobs in the
Ontario public school system (teaching jobs) and compare them to the graduates who did
find those jobs. To accomplish this, I create a new teacher salary dataset and combine it
with the data from the first two chapters. The results show that median teaching salaries
did not vary to any great extent across genders, cohorts and time periods since graduation.
However, the median non-teaching salaries varied substantially across those same factors.
iii
Moreover, the median teaching salaries were greater than non-teaching salaries across all
factors. Also, despite there not being any gender differences in teaching salaries, the non-
teaching median salaries were substantially greater for males than females.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three substantive chapters, which explore topics related to the
economics of education. Chapters 2 and 4 contribute to the economics teacher literature
by examining topics related to teacher labour markets, and Chapter 3, contributes to the
returns to education literature in the context of program and university choice.
In Chapter 2, I examine teacher labour markets from the perspective of recent Ontario
teachers’ college graduates. Teachers play a vital role in the academic outcomes of stu-
dents. Typically, research studying teacher labour supply examines contexts where there
are fewer qualified teachers than available positions. This shortage environment is helpful
for understanding how teachers select themselves in and out of teaching because schools
in this position have little discretion about which teachers to hire. Recently, many juris-
dictions, including Ontario, have begun to experience teacher surpluses which presents an
opportunity to answer a different important policy question: How do teacher characteristics
affect the probability of obtaining a teaching job? In this paper, I use duration analysis to
provide evidence about this issue.
Suitable data for this type of analysis require information not only about employed
individuals but also about individuals who are eligible to teach but do not receive a job;
unfortunately, this type of data has not traditionally been available. I overcome the current
lack of data by web scraping and processing the Ontario public register of individuals who
are eligible to teach.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The results obtained using a duration model show variation in the probability of secur-
ing a permanent teaching position across the various cohorts of teacher graduates. The 2006
graduates had a 14 percent probability of acquiring a position in their first year, a probabil-
ity that had fallen to 5 percent by 2012 for that year’s graduating cohort. The results also
indicate substantial differences in hiring probabilities across teachers with different subject
qualifications. For example, in 2006 male elementary teachers with French qualifications
had a 46 percent success rate in their first year, while those with math qualifications only
secured a job 21 percent of the time. These results are relevant for policy because the cur-
rent concerns about the math performance of Ontario elementary students may be related
to the math qualifications of those who are teaching.
In Chapter 3, I switch my focus to examine the earnings of university graduates. Prospec-
tive university students make a decision about which institution to attend and what degree
program to pursue. It is natural for early-career discussions to centre around gaining ac-
ceptance to a “top school” based on the widespread notion that graduating from a relatively
prestigious institution will result in higher earnings. However, the economic literature sug-
gests that the degree program that students graduate with may also affect their earnings.
In this paper, I examine what is more important for earnings — the school that a student
attends or the degree program that he or she pursues.
Typically in the literature, the respective effects of school and program choices on earn-
ings are studied separately; yet, the reality is that, when students make these decisions, they
have to consider them together. One of the contributions of this study is that I compare the
variation in earnings across programs and schools jointly. The type of question that I an-
swer is as follows: How do the earnings of graduates of low-earning programs at highly
selective schools compare relative to the earnings of graduates of high-earning programs
at less-selective schools? The reason why few studies jointly examine school and program
choices is the lack of available data. Most general labour datasets contain observations
about education programs but lack the kind of institutional information that would allow
2
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researchers to connect observations across the same schools. I overcome these issues by
using a unique source of restricted government-administered data, the restricted version
of the Ontario Graduate University Survey (OUGS). The public-use version of these data
only provides median salaries and only for a limited number of schools. However, the re-
stricted version of this dataset makes this study possible because it contains information on
the entire salary distribution (and not just on the median) across all universities and their
programs in the province. In particular, this study uses a method called relative-importance
analysis, which partitions the variation in earnings into program and school components
and thus allows me to determine the degree to which they affect earnings.
The results show that there is substantially more variation in earnings across programs
than across schools, both at the undergraduate and the professional-degree levels. For the
undergraduate programs, around 21.5 percent of the variation in earnings can be attributed
to the programs while around 2.6 percent of this variation can be attributed to the schools
(six months after graduation); in other words, the amount of variation in earnings was
around eight times greater for programs than for schools. For the professional-degree pro-
grams, the variation in earnings was around three times greater than for the schools. The
results of this study suggest that students can feel confident about enrolling in their pro-
gram of choice, even if it is not offered by the most prestigious, highly ranked university,
because schools do not explain the majority of the variation in earnings.
In Chapter 4, in addition to creating a new teacher salary dataset, I utilize the data
from the first two chapters to study the earnings of recent teachers’ college graduates.
Economists are typically interested in the basis on which individuals choose to enter, re-
main in or exit the teacher workforce. A fundamental aspect of understanding these deci-
sions is comprised of the opportunity cost of teaching. Unfortunately, little is known about
this opportunity cost and in order to estimate it, we usually need to observe teachers over
an extended period in both teaching and non-teaching jobs; however, this type of longi-
tudinal data is challenging to obtain. The ideal data for the estimation of these teachers’
3
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opportunity cost would include the many teachers’ college graduates who randomly chose
to pursue non-teaching positions. In practice, most teachers’ college graduates work as
teachers for an extended period and, when they eventually leave teaching, they frequently
do so for family reasons (e.g., the birth of a child); as a result, there are few opportunities
to observe teachers in alternative occupations.
In this study, I estimate the outside-option earnings of the 2007 to 2013 graduates of an
Ontario teachers’ college. To do this, I take advantage of the unique environment in On-
tario, Canada where, instead of the more typical teacher-shortage environment, the teacher
labour market has experienced a surplus since around 2005. This environment is similar
to the above-mentioned ideal situation, in that the majority of new teacher graduates were
unable to find a permanent teaching position and, thus, many had to pursue opportunities
outside the public school system. The first step in the estimation of the outside-option
earnings uses a unique teacher dataset to determine the salaries of the graduates who did
in fact acquire a teaching job within the Ontario public school system. The second step
in this estimation process uses the teaching salary information obtained in the first step in
combination with a second dataset — the restricted-access and government-administered
Ontario University Graduate Survey (OUGS) which contains the salaries of Ontario teach-
ers’ college graduates who at the time of the survey were employed in either a teaching
or a non-teaching position — to estimate the salaries for the outside option alone (i.e., for
non-teaching positions).
The results indicate that the outside-option salaries varied substantially across cohorts,
genders and time periods since graduation; the median outside-option salary was highest
at $45,357 for the 2007 male cohort at the two-year milestone since graduation, while the
lowest was $23,822 for the 2013 female cohort at the six-month milestone since graduation.
In contrast, the teaching salaries did not vary to any great extent across any of the factors;
the median teaching salary was highest at $49,706 for the 2011 male cohort at two years
after graduation, and lowest at $46,800 for the 2007 females at six months after graduation.
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Furthermore, when comparing salaries of members of the same graduating cohort year, the
teachers at the median earned more than the graduates who had found an outside job, both
for males and females and for salaries at the six-month and two-year milestones since
graduation. The greatest difference was for the 2012 females at six months after graduation
when the median teaching salaries were 103 percent higher than the median outside-job
salaries; the smallest difference was for the 2007 males at two years after graduation when
the teaching salaries were only 5 percent higher than the outside-job salaries. There were no
statistically significant gender differences across teaching salaries within the same cohort
year and period since graduation. For the outside-option jobs, males earned more than
females in every graduating cohort and for both the six-month and two-year milestone
periods since graduation.
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Chapter 2
What Teacher Characteristics Do
Schools Value? Evidence from Ontario,
Canada
2.1 Introduction
Studying teacher labour markets is essential not only because teachers comprise a large
portion of the education-system budget, but also because research suggests that teachers
play a vital role in the academic outcomes of students (Araujo, Carneiro, Cruz-Aguayo, &
Schady, 2016; Gerritsen, Plug, & Webbink, 2017; Hanushek, 2011). Investments in edu-
cation that improve student achievement can positively impact the economic development
of a country. For instance, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) demonstrate that improving
cognitive skills by one standard deviation can improve GDP per capita by as much as two
percentage points. Moreover, Hanushek, Ruhose, and Woessmann (2017) claim that dif-
ferences in educational attainment and cognitive skills are positively correlated with GDP
per capita and explain 20 to 30 percent of the income variation across U.S. states. Modern
industries rely heavily on quantitative skills; therefore, math achievement at the elementary
grade levels is crucial as it improves future academic success and thus results in higher
wages and more stable employment later in life (J. James, 2013). An ongoing debate in
Ontario is raising questions about the math qualifications of elementary teachers because
6
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the proportion of Grade 6 students whose standardized math assessment scores were at
least at the provincial standard declined from 63 percent to 49 percent between 2008 and
2017 (Education Quality and Accountability Office [EQAO], 2013, 2018).
Current teacher-market literature focuses on teachers’ labour-supply decisions, and the
usual concerns deal with how to attract and retain the most qualified teachers.1 Tradition-
ally, the literature examines contexts where there are fewer qualified teachers than available
positions. In such teacher-shortage environments, schools struggle to find qualified teach-
ers; therefore, they have little discretion about which teachers to hire, thus making it diffi-
cult to study the teacher characteristics particularly valued by schools. However, recently
many jurisdictions, including Ontario, have begun to experience large teacher surpluses
which presents a unique opportunity to answer a different important policy question: How
do teacher characteristics affect the probability of obtaining a teaching job?2
To answer this question, I use duration analysis to examine the effects of subject qual-
ifications, grade divisions, gender and year of graduation from teachers’ college on the
probability of securing a permanent teaching position in the Ontario public school system.
For this study, an ideal dataset requires information about the subject qualifications of the
teachers’ college graduates, as well as timing information related to when they began the
job-search process. A common problem with the datasets that are typically used in labour
economics (e.g., NLSY, Youth in Transition) is the small number of respondents who are
teachers, and the lack of information about which subjects or grade divisions they are qual-
ified to teach. For these reasons, the literature commonly uses school administrative data
pertaining to individuals who often had already been hired as a teacher, thus making them
unsuitable for examining how schools select teachers. To overcome these data limitations, I
created a new dataset by web scraping and processing the Ontario public register of individ-
1A qualified teacher has a teaching licence and the subject qualifications needed for the particular teach-
ing job. For example, a teacher needs to complete a math qualification course in order to be qualified to teach
math. An example of an unqualified teacher is someone who is licensed to teach but teaches math without
math qualifications. I will also refer to anyone who is licensed to teach as a “teacher,” regardless of whether
he or she is employed.
2In this study, a "teaching job" refers to a permanent position in the Ontario public school system.
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uals who are licensed to teach. The main strength of these data is that they contain detailed
subject-qualification information about all Ontario teachers’ college graduates who are po-
tentially looking for a permanent teaching position.3 However, these data do not record
whether and when a teachers’ college graduate acquired a job. I overcome this problem
by recognizing that all new permanent teachers are required to complete the New Teacher
Induction Program (NTIP) shortly after starting their first teaching job. The NTIP is a pro-
gram designed to foster the professional development of new teachers and, accordingly,
the NTIP completion year is included in the data along with all of the other educational
qualifications; this allows me to ascertain when the teachers began their first job (Ontario
Ministry of Education [OME], 2010).
The results of this paper illustrate the fact that from 2006 to 2016 it was much more diffi-
cult to acquire a permanent teaching job than in 2001, a year in which around three-quarters
of that year’s graduating cohort found a permanent position (McIntyre, 2002).4 The simple
average probability of acquiring a job within the first year across the cohorts from 2006 to
2013 was nearly 9 percent5. Moreover, the probability of acquiring a permanent teaching
position in the Ontario public school system decreased for each successive cohort. For ex-
ample, I found that, for the first cohort in my sample, the probability of finding a job in the
first year was around four times higher than for the last cohort. The results also indicate
substantial differences in hiring probabilities across teachers with different subject qualifi-
cations. For example, in 2006 male elementary teachers with French qualifications had a
46 percent success rate in their first year, while those with math qualifications only secured
a job 21 percent of the time. Although there is a benefit associated with graduates having
one or more particular subject qualifications in a core area like math, reading and writing,
by far the greatest benefit resulted from having French qualifications. One possible reason
3I assume that only the graduates who acquired a teaching certification can search for jobs. The data only
include graduates who applied for a teaching licence; however, since the Ontario teachers’ college enrolments
are similar to the number of graduates in the data, it appears that the majority of graduates acquire a teaching
licence (Ontario Universities’ Application Centre [OUAC], 2006-2013).
4In 2001, it was considered “easy” to find a job.
5This calculation uses Model A from the analysis in this chapter; refer to Table 2.4 in Section 2.5.
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why elementary schools hired teachers with French qualifications more than those with
math qualifications is that, unlike math, French usually requires subject qualifications. The
regulatory policies governing French teaching in elementary schools are different from and
are more rigorous than those governing the teaching of other subjects like math (Ontario
College of Teachers [OCT], 2005, 2019d). These results are relevant for policy making
because current concerns about Ontario elementary students’ math performance may be
related to the math qualifications of those who are teaching (Casey & Jones, 2017; Stokke,
2015).
Many studies of the teacher labour markets use duration analysis to examine decisions
related to staying in and leaving teaching (Allen, Burgess, & Mayo, 2018; Dolton, 2006;
Dolton & Von der Klaauw, 1995; T. R. Stinebrickner, 1998, 1999, 2002). A handful of
recent studies use data that contain all licensed teachers, including those without a teaching
position, to study entry into teaching. Goldhaber, Krieg, and Theobald (2014) examined
the duration to the first teaching job using intern data from six Washington-state teachers’
colleges. Bacolod (2007) analyzed the determinants of entry into the teaching profession
in the U.S., and the sorting of teachers into rural, urban and suburban schools, using longi-
tudinal data that followed a single 1993 cohort of bachelor’s degree graduates.
In Section 2, I briefly outline the qualifications that are needed in order to become a
teacher in Ontario. In Section 3, I present descriptive statistics. In Section 4, I introduce
the analysis methodology and the results, and, in Section 5, I conclude.
2.2 Teaching in Ontario
The Ontario College of Teachers licenses public-school teachers in Ontario; this study fo-
cuses on general and technological education teachers. General education teachers must
be certified in at least two consecutive grade divisions: Primary/Junior (Kindergarten to
Grade 6), Junior/Intermediate (Grades 4 to 10) and Intermediate/Senior (Grades 7 to 12).
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For the elementary grades for the younger students, Primary/Junior teachers do not require
any specialist subject qualifications.6 Junior/Intermediate teachers need at least one spe-
cialist subject qualification, and Intermediate/Senior teachers require at least two specialist
subject qualifications. In Ontario, elementary school runs from Kindergarten to Grade 8,
and high school runs from Grades 9 to 12. Teachers with technological education subjects
are qualified to teach in at least one of the high-school technological divisions, Grades 9 to
10 and/or Grades 11 to 12 (OCT, 2019e, 2019f).
In order to fulfill the educational requirements, general education teachers need to com-
plete at least a three-year bachelor’s degree, and an accredited teacher education program.
Technological education teachers need to complete a combination of experience and edu-
cation in the technological field that they will teach, and an accredited teacher education
program (OCT, 2019e, 2019f).7
2.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper was created by web scraping and by gathering and organizing
teacher administrative profiles from the public register available on the Ontario College of
Teachers website.8 The dataset that I use in this study contains 62,409 licensed teachers
6Even though the younger students, until Grade 6, have the same teacher for most subjects (a generalist
teacher), they may still have a specialist for some subjects (e.g., French and music). From Grades 7 to 12,
students usually have several teachers, each of whom is specialized in a different subject. It is essential to
highlight that the term "specialist" within the context of this paper is used to differentiate between specialist
and generalist types of teachers, as opposed to specialist types of subject qualifications. The Ontario College
of Teachers Act defines various kinds of subject qualification courses, which are available across different
subjects (e.g., math); for instance, there are one-session honour specialist courses, and three-session qualifi-
cations, of which the last session is a specialist course. Moreover, in the context of the subject qualification
course types, "specialist" refers to the level of proficiency needed to complete these courses; however, this
distinction between the different proficiency levels related to subject qualifications is beyond the scope of this
study (Government of Ontario, 2017).
7During the analysis period of this paper, teachers were required to have completed a one-year teacher
education program over two semesters. Since 2015, teachers have been required to have completed a two-
year education program over four semesters. It is possible to be a technological teacher without education in
the technological field, but it requires five years of on-the-job experience.
8A teacher profile can be accessed through a search bar on the OCT website by either inputting the
teacher’s name or registration number (OCT, 2019b).
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who graduated from an Ontario teacher education program and spans the years 2006 to
2016 for the graduating-year cohorts 2006 to 2013. The data exclude 5,344 teachers’ col-
lege graduates, or 7.8 percent of all Ontario teachers’ college graduates, who hold French
grade division qualifications and therefore can teach in French-language schools.9 The fol-
lowing variables are observed in the data: first and last names, year of graduation from
an Ontario teachers’ college (cohort), the subject and grade-division qualifications and the
associated years in which they were acquired, the completion year of the New Teacher In-
duction Program and the historical status of the licence (e.g., Good Standing or Expired)
along with the associated dates.
In practice, many teachers exceed the minimum number of required subject qualifica-
tions. To simplify the analysis, I group the teachers into one of the following mutually
exclusive subject qualification categories: French, technology, math, reading/writing, no
subject and all others.10 Refer to the Appendix Section A.1.1 for details on how I con-
structed these groups and for other data-related information.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the number of graduates by graduating-year cohort, who hold
certifications in the various subject qualifications and grade divisions, respectively. One of
the notable patterns is the increasing trend in the percentage of individuals with French-
language subject qualifications for the later cohorts. Furthermore, there was growth across
successive cohorts in the proportion of graduates who became certified to teach at both
elementary and high school grade levels. Table 2.3 lists the number of graduates who hold
various subject qualifications across grade divisions. From this table, it is worth high-
lighting that French qualifications are most common for teachers certified to teach in both
elementary and high school, and math qualifications are most common among high school
9The data also exclude 500 graduates who acquired a position before they graduated from teachers’ col-
lege (under the variable timing assumptions; refer to Appendix Section A.1.3 for more details), 39 graduates
who completed more than one teacher education program and 10 native-language-only teachers. Further-
more, I also dropped 65 teachers who had completed a diploma program but were not technology teachers
and held no other bachelor’s degree.
10Throughout the paper, reading/writing refers to a graduate holding qualifications in either reading, writ-
ing, or both.
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teachers. The dataset does not contain the gender of the individuals, but it does include their
first and last names, and in Appendix Section A.1.2 I discuss how I use this information to
estimate the probability of the individual being male or female.
Table 2.1: Subject Qualifications by Graduating-Year Cohort
Year
Subject Qualifications
Total11
French Technology Math Reading/Writing No Subject All Others
2006 699 169 973 700 2333 5041 9915
7.0% 1.7% 9.8% 7.1% 23.5% 50.8%
2007 857 234 941 823 2473 5358 10686
8.0% 2.2% 8.8% 7.7% 23.1% 50.1%
2008 979 240 1095 922 2278 5594 11108
8.8% 2.2% 9.9% 8.3% 20.5% 50.4%
2009 997 191 1085 829 2306 5783 11191
8.9% 1.7% 9.7% 7.4% 20.6% 51.7%
2010 1057 256 1095 811 2406 5733 11358
9.3% 2.3% 9.6% 7.1% 21.2% 50.5%
2011 1088 271 1177 700 2218 5390 10844
10.0% 2.5% 10.9% 6.5% 20.5% 49.7%
2012 1087 237 1236 568 2071 5074 10273
10.6% 2.3$ 12.0% 5.5% 20.2% 49.4%
2013† 969 168 1254 323 1509 4106 8329
11.6% 2.0% 15.1% 3.9% 18.1% 49.3%
Total 7733 1766 8856 5676 17594 42079 83704
9.2% 2.1% 10.6% 6.8% 21.0% 50.3%
Notes:† Refer to Table 2.2 for non-time-varying totals for each cohort year.
11Although the subject qualification and grade division categories are mutually exclusive, the number
of individuals across the subject qualifications and grade divisions does not add up to the total number of
individuals in the data. The reason for this is that these variables are time-varying (i.e., they are only mutually
exclusive in any given period, which means that individuals can move to other categories over time). In any
given period, a graduate is in one grade division and one subject qualification category. Note that in Table
2.1, the rows add up to 100 percent (i.e., the denominators are located in the last column).
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Table 2.2: Grade Divisions by Graduating-Year Cohort
Year
Grade Divisions
Total Total*
Elementary High School Elementary/High School12
2006 3202 2589 2642 8433 7716
38.0% 30.7% 31.3%
2007 3438 2713 2838 8989 8129
38.2% 30.2% 31.6%
2008 3346 2817 3245 9408 8229
35.6% 29.9% 34.5%
2009 3378 2798 3370 9546 8265
35.4% 29.3% 35.3%
2010 3465 2647 3582 9694 8300
35.7% 27.3% 37.0%
2011 3275 2711 3426 9412 8027
34.8% 28.8% 36.4%
2012 3097 2442 3381 8920 7548
34.7% 27.4% 37.9%
2013† 2458 1908 2893 7259 6195
33.9% 26.3% 39.9%
Total 25659 20625 25377 71661 62409
35.8% 28.8% 35.4%
Notes: “Total*” refers to the sums across the cohorts only (i.e. does not account for grade divisions
and subject qualifications); thus, it is not time-varying. Also, the rows add up to 100% (i.e., the
denominators are located in the “Total” column). † The number of graduates in 2013 is lower relative
to 2012 due to the exclusion of teachers who acquired their teaching certification after 2013; refer to
Section A.1.4 for more details. Furthermore, Section A.1.4 reports descriptive statistics that are similar to
Tables 2.1 and 2.2, with the difference being that Section A.1.4 only includes information about the first
year on the job market (i.e., not time varying).
12Throughout the paper, Elementary/High School refers to Elementary and High School.
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Table 2.3: Subject Qualifications by Grade Divisions
Subject Qualifications
Grade Divisions
Total
Elementary High School Elementary/High School
French 2767 2099 3526 8392
7.3% 9.5% 11.8% 9.3%
Technology 0 1682 99 1781
0.0% 7.6% 0.3% 2.0%
Math 1092 4381 3814 9287
2.9% 19.7% 12.8% 10.3%
Reading/Writing 3445 146 2560 6151
9.1% 0.7% 8.6% 6.8%
No Subject 17594 0 0 17594
46.5% 0.0% 0.0% 19.6%
All Others 12927 13901 19825 46653
34.2% 62.6% 66.5% 51.9%
Total 37825 22209 29824 89858
Notes: The columns add up to 100% (i.e., the denominators are located in the last row).
2.3.1 When Do the Teachers Obtain a Permanent Job?
The data do not directly indicate when the teachers acquire a permanent position. How-
ever, this information can be obtained from the New Teacher Induction Program (NTIP)
completion date which is available in the data. Starting in 2006, the law has required that
all new permanent teachers in the Ontario public school system complete the NTIP. The
majority of teachers pass this program within one year and, although failing is possible, it
is uncommon in practice (Maharaj, 2014; Miller, 2009; OME, 2010). I assume that people
start looking for a job as soon as they graduate from teachers’ college and that they start
the permanent job one year before their NTIP completion date.13
13In the collected data, between around 80 and 95 percent of graduates acquired a teaching licence in the
same year in which they graduated. See Appendix Section A.1.3 for more details.
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2.4 Duration Analysis
The analysis in this paper relies on discrete-time duration models which account for right
censoring. In Section 2.4.1, the Kaplan-Meier survival curves provide a preliminary com-
parison of durations until the start of the first teaching job across several groups (Kaplan
& Meier, 1958). In Section 2.4.2, a semi-parametric hazard function incorporates teacher
characteristics to analyze the probability of attaining a permanent position in the Ontario
public school system.
2.4.1 Kaplan-Meier Survival Function
Letting T be a discrete random variable, with t ≥ 0 denoting the number of years since the
graduate began looking for a job. The Kaplan-Meier survival function characterizes the
probability of not finding a job until after time t as follows:
S (t) = Pr(T > t). (2.1)
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Figure 2.1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function: Duration Until First Permanent Teaching Job by
Graduating-Year Cohort
Figure 2.1 shows the survival functions based on the year in which the individual grad-
uated and started searching for a permanent teaching job in the Ontario public school sys-
tem.14 The probability of acquiring a job decreased for each successive cohort in my sam-
ple. For example, 35 percent of teachers from the 2006 cohort and only 18 percent of
teachers from the 2008 cohort found a job within two years.
14I assumed that individuals began to search for a job in the same year in which they graduated (for
majority of graduates). Refer to Appendix Section A.1.3 for more details on the timing in the data. The
Kaplan-Meier curves are shorter for subsequent cohorts due to right censoring resulting from the end of the
analysis period.
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Figure 2.2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function: Duration Until First Permanent Teaching Job by Sub-
ject Qualifications (Elementary Teachers)
Figure 2.2 shows the survival functions for the reading/writing, math and French qual-
ifications and, even though it does not apply to a particular cohort, it offers a preliminary
sense of the amount of time in which graduates were able to secure a position within the
analysis period across the various subject qualifications.15 The elementary school teach-
ers with French-language qualifications had a much higher probability of being hired for
a job than teachers with qualifications in reading/writing or math.16 After two years, 11
percent of teachers with math qualifications had a job, in contrast with 19 percent for read-
ing/writing and 51 percent for French. At four years, the percentage of individuals who
15Since the standard Kaplan-Meier analysis does not allow time-varying covariates, I only include obser-
vations from teachers who had the subject qualifications no later than one year after starting to search for a
job and who had acquired the qualifications before finding a job. Further, I only include graduates who never
acquired high-school-level qualifications.
16In this paper, I refer to graduates as “elementary” school teachers when they only hold elementary grade
division qualifications, rather than necessarily having obtained a primary school teaching position. Moreover,
in reality, teachers can be assigned elementary grade level positions without having elementary grade level
qualifications (Government of Ontario, 2011).
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had a position was 22 percent for math, 41 percent for reading/writing and 70 percent for
French.
2.4.2 Discrete-Time Hazard-Based Duration Model
The central component of a duration model is the hazard function, which is the probability
of finding a job at time t conditional on not finding one in an earlier period: h = Pr(T =
t|T > t).17 The hazard function with covariates measures the effect of teacher characteristics
on the probability of securing a job.18
The hazard probability for each individual i at time t and gender j is:
h ji,t =
exp(xiβ+1i, j= fβ f + di,tβd,t)
1 + exp(xiβ+1i, j= fβ f + di,tβd,t)
. (2.2)
For individual i at time t, xi,t is the vector of covariates (apart from the gender and
baseline hazard indicator variables) and β is the corresponding vector of coefficients, 1i, j= f
is the indicator variable for gender (=1 for j = f ) where j = {m, f } for male and female,
β f is a coefficient for female and yi,t is an indicator variable denoting whether individual i
acquired a job (job=1) at time t. The non-parametric baseline hazard indicator variable is
di,t, which means that, if this variable equals one, it follows that individual i found a job in
year t, and the corresponding coefficient is βd,t.
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood. I evaluate the log-likelihood func-
tion for each individual i over time t, starting from the graduation year and ending when the
individual obtains a job or is censored. Censoring occurs when the individual is no longer
licensed or when the study ends.
Although gender is not directly reflected in the data, I obtain the probability of an
individual i being female, p f ,i , by using their first and last names which are available in the
17This model is based on Singer and Willett (1993).
18The subject qualifications and grade divisions in this model are time-varying because teachers often
acquire qualifications over time in order to improve their chances of finding a teaching job.
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data.19 The contribution of individual i to the likelihood is found by integrating the gender-
specific likelihood function, which can be written as (h ji,t)
yi,t(1− h ji,t)
1−yi,t , over j = {m, f }.
The log-likelihood for the full sample is given by equation 2.3:
ln L(β; x) =
∑
i
∑
t
ln
p f ,i(h j= fi,t )yi,t(1−h j= fi,t )1−yi,t︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
f emale
+ (1− p f ,i)(h
j=m
i,t )
yi,t(1−h j=mi,t )
1−yi,t︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
male
 .
(2.3)
2.5 Results
The results of the hazard-based duration models A to F are provided in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
The dependent variable is binary and equal to one when the teachers’ college graduates find
a permanent position in the Ontario public school system. Model A includes the baseline
hazard, gender and the graduating-year cohorts. Model B is similar to Model A but also
includes grade divisions, and Model C additionally includes subject qualifications. Models
D to F were estimated separately for each grade division category.20
The baseline hazard in each model is non-parametric with indicator variables denoting
each year in which an individual was at risk of finding a job. The baseline values vary
across the models, but the pattern is similar showing negative duration dependence. For
example, from Model C, it is evident that the 2006 graduates with elementary-grade divi-
sion qualifications and no subject had a 33 percent higher probability of finding a job in
their first year relative to their third year on the job market.
The probability of acquiring a teaching position decreased for each successive cohort.
For example, based on Model A, the 2006 graduates had a 14 percent probability of ac-
19See Section A.1.2 for more details on the process that I use to derive the probability of being female
from the first and last names of the teachers..
20Technological education is omitted from Model D because it is not available in elementary school, and
no-subject is omitted from Models E and F because teachers are required to have subject qualifications in
those grade divisions. Model F is for teachers qualified in any combination of overlapping high-school and
elementary divisions.
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quiring a job in their first year, while this probability had fallen to 5 percent by 2012 for
that year’s graduating cohort. There is also substantial variation in the probability of find-
ing a job across subject qualifications. Teachers had the highest probability of acquiring
a job with French qualifications in every model except for Model E (high school), where
it was close to being equal to technological qualifications. For example, for Models C to
F, the odds of finding a teaching job with French qualifications were around 3 to 5 times
higher relative to all-others qualifications. In the elementary division based on Models C
and D, the probability of obtaining a job with reading/writing or math qualifications was
higher relative to all-others qualifications, and was notably higher relative to teachers with
no subject. For example, based on Model D, for the 2006 cohort of elementary teachers,
the probability of finding a job in the first year was around four to five times higher for
teachers with reading/writing or math qualifications than with no subject.21 Gender has no
statistically significant effect in Models A, C and F.22 In Models B and E, females had a
higher probability of acquiring a job and, in Model D, males had a higher probability of
acquiring a job.
21Teacher graduates in the elementary division in the no-subject group comprised a large portion of all
teacher graduates with elementary qualifications only (around 69 percent were in the no-subject category for
at least one time period) and, because these teachers are generalists, they are not required by the licensing
regulations to have any specific subject qualifications (e.g., math, French).
22Statistical significance is assumed to be p < 0.05.
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Table 2.4: Discrete-Time Hazard-Based Duration Model Results: A to C
Model A Model B Model C – Full
Model
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error)
Gender: Reference Group: Male
Female 0.03 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Graduating-Year Cohort: Reference Group: 2013
2006 1.38 (0.04) 1.42 (0.04) 1.66 (0.04)
2007 1.25 (0.04) 1.28 (0.04) 1.50 (0.04)
2008 1.05 (0.04) 1.08 (0.04) 1.25 (0.04)
2009 0.82 (0.04) 0.84 (0.04) 1.01 (0.04)
2010 0.64 (0.04) 0.66 (0.04) 0.79 (0.04)
2011 0.42 (0.04) 0.43 (0.04) 0.53 (0.04)
2012 0.18 (0.04) 0.19 (0.04) 0.25 (0.04)
Grade Divisions: Reference Group: Elementary
Elementary/High Sch. – 0.40 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
High School – 0.16 (0.02) -0.31 (0.02)
Subject Qualifications: Reference Group: All Others
No Subject – – -1.14 (0.03)
French – – 1.47 (0.02)
Technology – – 1.02 (0.04)
Mathematics – – 0.31 (0.02)
Reading/Writing – – 0.59 (0.03)
Sample Size
Obs. N 326563 326563 326563
Ind. i 62409 62409 62409
Baseline Hazard †
d1 -3.19 (0.04) -3.41 (0.04) -3.29 (0.04)
d2 -3.22 (0.04) -3.47 (0.04) -3.44 (0.04)
d3 -3.32 (0.04) -3.58 (0.04) -3.59 (0.04)
d4 -3.37 (0.04) -3.63 (0.04) -3.66 (0.04)
d5 -3.51 (0.04) -3.78 (0.05) -3.83 (0.05)
d6 -3.64 (0.05) -3.91 (0.05) -3.97 (0.05)
d7 -3.77 (0.05) -4.04 (0.05) -4.12 (0.05)
d8 -3.89 (0.05) -4.18 (0.05) -4.27 (0.06)
d9 -4.10 (0.06) -4.39 (0.06) -4.51 (0.06)
d10 -4.65 (0.09) -4.94 (0.09) -5.07 (0.09)
d11 -4.90 (0.13) -5.19 (0.14) -5.37 (0.14)
Notes: † Indicator variables for each year in which the graduate was at risk of obtaining a job.
All coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.05 except for “Female” in Model C.
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Table 2.5: Discrete-Time Hazard-Based Duration Model Results: D to F
Model D –
Elementary
Model E – High
School
Model F –
Elementary/High
School
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error)
Gender: Reference Group: Male
Female -0.14 (0.04) 0.08 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
Graduating-Year Cohort: Reference Group: 2013
2006 2.00 (0.08) 1.98 (0.08) 1.23 (0.06)
2007 1.75 (0.08) 1.83 (0.08) 1.15 (0.06)
2008 1.42 (0.08) 1.60 (0.08) 0.95 (0.06)
2009 1.11 (0.08) 1.24 (0.08) 0.86 (0.06)
2010 0.83 (0.08) 0.98 (0.09) 0.68 (0.06)
2011 0.62 (0.08) 0.62 (0.09) 0.44 (0.06)
2012 0.36 (0.09) 0.20 (0.10) 0.21 (0.06)
Grade Divisions: Reference Group: Elementary
Elementary/High Sch. – – –
High School – – –
Subject Qualifications: Reference Group: All Others23
No Subject -1.15 (0.03) – –
French 1.65 (0.03) 1.13 (0.04) 1.53 (0.03)
Technology – 1.04 (0.04) 0.47 (0.18)
Mathematics 0.71 (0.08) 0.30 (0.03) 0.18 (0.04)
Reading/Writing 0.52 (0.04) -0.34 (0.27) 0.70 (0.04)
Sample Size
Obs. N 116128 92867 117568
Ind. i24 25659 20625 25377
Baseline Hazard
d1 -3.29 (0.08) -3.69 (0.08) -3.34 (0.06)
d2 -3.56 (0.08) -3.83 (0.08) -3.32 (0.06)
d3 -3.70 (0.08) -4.10 (0.09) -3.35 (0.06)
d4 -3.80 (0.09) -4.34 (0.09) -3.32 (0.06)
d5 -3.97 (0.09) -4.63 (0.10) -3.44 (0.06)
d6 -4.04 (0.09) -4.94 (0.10) -3.56 (0.07)
d7 -4.23 (0.10) -5.15 (0.11) -3.66 (0.07)
d8 -4.25 (0.10) -5.43 (0.13) -3.83 (0.08)
d9 -4.46 (0.12) -5.57 (0.15) -4.09 (0.09)
d10 -5.42 (0.17) -6.01 (0.20) -4.46 (0.12)
d11 -5.49 (0.25) -6.69 (0.37) -4.75 (0.19)
Notes: All coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.05 except for “Reading/Writing”
in Model E.
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I create a unique dataset by web scraping the Ontario public register of li-
censed teachers. Taking advantage of this data allows me to examine how teacher char-
acteristics affect the probability of acquiring a permanent teaching position in the Ontario
public education system. The data include the 2006 to 2013 graduates of Ontario teacher
education programs, and span the years 2006 to 2016.
People were aware of the fact that it was a challenge to find a teaching position in
Ontario during this time; however, it is not entirely clear which types of teachers and how
many were experiencing difficulties. This paper provides the first comprehensive evidence
of how challenging it actually was to obtain a teaching job. The probability of finding a
position in 2006 was around four times higher than it was in 2013 (for new graduates in
their first year on the job market), and even more striking is the comparison with 2001
when the probability of finding a teaching job was around 20 times higher than it was in
2013.25 Clearly it has become increasingly difficult for each successive cohort to find a
teaching position.
It seems natural to imagine that some teachers may have believed that they could im-
prove their chances of finding a position by acquiring one or more subject qualifications
and, even though there was some benefit to having such as qualification in a core area like
math, reading or writing, this was still relatively insignificant in comparison with the ben-
efit of having a French-language qualification. One possible explanation for elementary
schools’ tendency to place a greater value on French qualifications than on math quali-
23The results from the hazard Model D contradict the Kaplan-Meier results in figure 2.2. According to
the Kaplan-Meier analysis, graduates with mathematics qualifications had a lower probability of acquiring
teaching jobs than those with reading/writing qualifications. This demonstrates the importance of includ-
ing time-varying covariates, which standard Kaplan-Meier analysis does not incorporate. The reason for the
difference is likely due to something the individuals with math qualifications (and no reading/writing qualifi-
cations) did over time that correlated with their increased chances of obtaining jobs relative to the individuals
with reading/writing qualifications (and no math qualifications).
24The same individuals can appear in Models D–F since the Grade Divisions are time-varying.
25This comparison refers to acquiring a job in the first year on the job market for those graduating-year
cohorts. In the sample period between 2006 and 2013, the teacher labour market was in an over-supply
environment (more teachers than jobs). On the other hand, it was considered “easy” to find a job in 2001.
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fications is the existence of regulatory policies. Teaching French in elementary schools
usually requires subject qualifications because of regulations, whereas teaching math does
not (OCT, 2005, 2019d). It is apparent to most observers that effective teachers of French
should be competent in the subject; however, one might also be concerned that there is a
perception that all elementary teachers have the proficiency to teach math, even without a
subject qualification. The fact that schools do not capitalize on the opportunity to hire more
math-qualified teachers is disconcerting, especially in light of policy discussions related to
the recent declines in the math performance of Ontario elementary students. Additionally,
the fact that Quebec elementary students are exceeding their Ontario peers in standardized
math assessments further amplifies these types of policy discussions, by Ontario govern-
ment regulators and other stakeholders, about math performance (Alphonso, 2018a).
Some speculate that the discrepancy in math performance between Quebec and Ontario
is attributable to the differences in teacher-training regulations between these provinces
(Alphonso, 2018b; Peritz, 2013; Valiante, 2017). In Quebec, all teachers finish a four-year
teacher program as opposed to a two-year program in Ontario (before 2015 it was just
one year). Ontario and Quebec elementary teachers do not require math subject qualifi-
cations; however, elementary teacher training in Quebec places more emphasis on math
than its Ontario counterpart. Furthermore, in Quebec, students begin high school in Grade
7 as opposed to Grade 9 in Ontario. Since math qualifications are only mandatory at the
high-school level, Quebec students benefit from having teachers with more math qualifi-
cations in earlier grades (Alphonso, 2018b). The evidence suggests that teachers who are
more confident in their math skills are more effective at passing on these abilities (Stokke,
2015). Examining the school hiring processes can help us to understand the types of policy
interventions that are appropriate in improving student outcomes.
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Chapter 3
What Has the Greater Effect on
Earnings, the University You Attend or
the Degree Program You Pursue?
3.1 Introduction
Each year, thousands of prospective students apply to university. In the process, they decide
which school to attend and what degree program to pursue. It is natural for early-career
discussions to centre around gaining acceptance to a “top school” based on the widespread
notion that graduating from a more prestigious institution will result in higher earnings.
However, the economic literature suggests that the degree program students graduate with
may also affect their earnings. The main objective of this paper is to determine the ex-
tent to which school choice is important relative to program choice from the standpoint of
earnings.
To do the above-mentioned, I use a method called relative-importance analysis which
calculates the sum of the squared deviations from the mean and then partitions these de-
viations into and attributes these deviations to the respective amounts of earnings vari-
ation attributable to the programs, schools, interactions and an unexplained factor (i.e.,
within-group variation). The higher the percentage of variation in earnings that the anal-
This study uses data provided by the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities. The views ex-
pressed in this study are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry.
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ysis attributes to the programs or the schools, the greater the importance of that factor for
earnings or, put another way, the greater the significance of the effect that the factor has
on earnings. Relative-importance analysis is useful in this context because it allows for the
convenient analysis of the overall effects of schools and programs on earnings as opposed
to just pursuing a narrow focus on the effects of any particular school or program.
A limitation of the existing literature on the effects of school and program choices
on earnings is the fact that these decisions are typically studied separately, even though,
in practice, students make these decisions jointly. One of the contributions of this paper
is the joint comparison of the variation in earnings across degree programs and schools.
Analyzing the effects of school and program choices on earnings at the same time allows
not only for direct comparison but also for assessment of the interaction effects.
A specific example might help to illustrate the types of decision that a student may
consider. Suppose that a student has the opportunity to pursue a humanities program at a
selective and prestigious university but does not have high enough grades to be accepted
into the school’s science program. At the same time, this individual received acceptance
into a science program at a less selective and less prestigious university. The separate
examination of program and school choices would not make apparent which of these sce-
narios would provide a better earnings outcome. This lack of clarity points to the following
general question: Do individuals earn more money if they graduate from a low-earnings
program at a highly selective school rather than from a high-earnings program at a less
selective school?1
The problem with examining earnings based on schools without considering the spe-
cific programs is that, as a result of the omitted variables, the estimates might bias the
degree to which schools affect earnings. For instance, a school with more resources might,
on average, produce graduates with higher earnings, but only because more students at that
school complete high-earnings programs. Focusing only on that school without taking the
1Refer to Eide, Hilmer, and Showalter (2016) for a similar scenario.
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school’s program mix into account would overstate the effect of the school on earnings.
Thus, a comparison of institutions that excludes programs might falsely associate other
institutional characteristics with earnings. For instance, Betts, Ferrall, and Finnie (2013)
provide evidence that the exclusion of university characteristics from the estimation sub-
stantially overstated the effect of programs on earnings.
Similarly, the examination of earnings based on programs without considering schools
might bias the degree to which programs affect earnings. For example, the examination of
high-quality schools that devote more resources to low-earnings programs without consid-
ering other schools might lead to an overstatement of the effect of programs on earnings.2
The reason why there are few studies that consider the effects of schools and programs
on earnings jointly is the lack of available data that contain both schools and programs.
Additionally, the ideal data for this kind of research require that many of the schools offer
similar programs. Moreover, the definitions of the programs need to be similar across insti-
tutions in order to be comparable.3 I overcame these data issues by taking advantage of a
unique restricted-access government-administered survey, the Ontario University Graduate
Survey (OUGS). One advantage of using these data within this context is based on the fact
that many schools in Ontario offer similar programs in accordance with the high level of
homogeneity of the province’s post-secondary education system; this high level of homo-
geneity makes it convenient to make comparisons across schools. Another advantage that
provided an extra element that made this study possible is access to the restricted version of
the OUGS dataset, which contains information on entire salary distributions across nearly
all universities and their respective programs in Ontario. In contrast, the public-use ver-
sion of these data only provide median salaries for the programs and only cover a limited
number of schools.
A unique feature of the OUGS data is the fact that the observations contain not only
2Without controlling for school characteristics, such as the level of resources devoted to programs, the
program variables might pick up the school effect.
3For example, a particular category of business program should have similar courses across multiple
schools.
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individual program information but also the names of identifiable universities, which is
uncommon in these kinds of datasets. Typical general labour datasets contain program
information and school characteristics but no school identifiers and, if they do contain
school identifiers, there often are not enough observations for each school or for the various
school-program combinations.4 For example, E. James, Alsalam, Conaty, and To (1989)
used university fixed effects but did not have many observations per school; they used a data
sample with 2,280 students and 519 different schools. Similarly, Rumberger and Thomas
(1993) used a sample of 8,021 individuals across 262 schools. In contrast, the OUGS
data contain between 99,940 and 110,902 observations across 21 schools and 26 programs,
which is a large number of observations not just for schools but for most school-program
combinations.
The advantage of observing individuals within schools and across multiple schools is
the ability to account for the program mix within the schools and for the unobserved school
characteristics by means of fixed effects. Further, even though the OUGS data do not offer
researchers a rich set of variables, this database’s main strength of including a large number
of observations per school-program combination makes it ideal for undertaking a general
comparison of the amount of relative variation across both programs and schools. More-
over, the benefit of having access to the entire earnings distribution within each school-
program combination allows for the meaningful comparison of the within-group variation
in earnings relative to the between-group variation in earnings for schools and programs.5
This comparison is useful because it is possible for the ratio between the earnings variation
for programs and schools to be significant and yet for neither one to account for a sub-
4An example of a school-program combination or group is humanities at the University of Toronto. For
instance, if the data contain 30 observations for a particular school and if there are only 10 program categories,
there will only be a few observations within any particular school-program combination. Furthermore, when
conditioned for gender, the number of observations decreases even more, and many school-program combi-
nations would likely have zero observations.
5Having only a median salary for each school-program group would mean that there appears to be sig-
nificantly less variation within each program and school group, and therefore the regression would assign a
larger proportion of the variation to the program and school groups. In this case, the within-group variation
would be small.
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stantial part of the variation. For example, this enables the analysis to distinguish between
a scenario in which programs account for 2 percent of the earnings variation and schools
account for 0.2 percent of the same on the one hand and, on the other hand, a scenario in
which programs account for 20 percent of the earnings variation and schools account for 2
percent of the same.
The economic literature finds differences in earnings across graduates depending in part
on the university program that they completed. Arcidiacono (2004) found that, even when
accounting for selection bias, large premiums still exist for certain programs. For example,
his results show that mathematics is more important for earnings than verbal ability (e.g.,
the humanities). Additionally, both Arcidiacono (2004) and Wiswall and Zafar (2015)
found that earnings differences are predominately attributable to tastes for a particular type
of schooling and work, rather than to ability sorting. Moreover, Berger (1988) found that
students tend to choose programs that give them higher lifetime earnings, as opposed to
earnings in the first few years; his results also show that business, liberal arts and educa-
tion have flatter lifetime earnings curves than science and engineering. Kinsler and Pavan
(2015) found significant returns for science and business programs even after adjusting for
selection into the program based on ability.
Much like the literature on program choice, the school-choice literature also reports that
it matters for earnings where people go to school. The possible mechanisms for these earn-
ings differences are signalling, based on the admissions selectivity of the various schools,
and the human capital accumulation mechanism.6 Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999)
found a 39 percent premium for attending a top private U.S. college relative to the bottom
public college for a 1982 cohort, and a 26 percent premium for a top public college relative
to the bottom public college — even after controlling for the selection of various demo-
graphic variables such as test scores, gender, race and family income. Hoekstra (2009)
6Signalling refers to the prestige that comes with graduating from a more selective school, which may
be considered to “signal” ability to other parties. Furthermore, the underlying premise of the human capi-
tal accumulation mechanism is that graduates from higher-quality schools, or schools with more resources,
acquire more human capital.
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found that attendance at the most selective university in the state resulted in a 20 percent
premium for white men. On the other hand, Dale and Krueger (2002, 2014) found that, af-
ter adjusting for ability, college selectivity on average makes little difference to earnings —
though students from disadvantaged backgrounds seem to benefit the most from attending
more selective schools. Further, Dale and Krueger (2002) show results indicating that col-
lege graduates from schools with higher tuition fees had higher earnings, presumably due
to a higher quality of education; yet, in a follow-up study, Dale and Krueger (2014) found
that the effect had disappeared. Lindah and Regner (2005) examined university choices
using Swedish sibling data and found that earnings differ across schools, albeit without any
apparent causal mechanism. Additionally, they discovered a positive correlation between
earnings and the proportion of instructors who hold a doctoral degree, a finding that sup-
ports the human capital accumulation mechanism. However, they also found substantial
differences in earnings between brothers and sisters within the same family; this discovery,
made under the assumption that the quality of education is the same for females and males,
contradicts the conclusion that would seem to flow from the human capital accumulation
mechanism.
The most closely related research examines the relationship between school choice and
program choice. For example, Eide et al. (2016) analyzed how earnings vary across pro-
grams for different levels of school selectivity. They found that university selectivity posi-
tively affects business programs to the greatest extent and science programs to the smallest
extent. Further, Rumberger and Thomas (1993) found that school quality, programs and
students’ academic performance all contribute to earnings. Even though they were able
to account for both schools and programs, they were unable to consider any interactions
because of various data limitations (they did separate regressions by program group). E.
James et al. (1989) discovered that schools accounted for about 1 to 2 percent of the earn-
ings variance without accounting for programs; however, when controlling for programs,
the amount of variation explained by the schools decreased to below 1 percent. They also
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discovered that the programs, combined with level of GPA, the number of math credits
taken and post-graduate degrees, explained about 3 to 5 percent of the variation in earn-
ings. Li, Meng, Shi, and Wu (2012) examined schools but also controlled for programs;
they found that, in China, attending an elite institution gave an overall 26.4 percent pre-
mium which decreased to 10.7 percent after controlling for selection (e.g., ability, pro-
gram). They attributed most of the premium from attending an elite institution to the hu-
man capital accumulation mechanism. From a Canadian perspective, Betts et al. (2013)
studied the effects of school characteristics on earnings. They found, first, that an increase
in undergraduate enrolment leads to lower earnings due to the reduced educational quality
caused by the crowding-out effect and, second, that for men an increase in the professor-
to-student ratio leads to higher earnings. They controlled for programs within schools and,
because they had access to school identifiers, they could use school fixed effects to control
for unobservable school characteristics.
In this study, instead of examining the effects on earnings of specific school charac-
teristics or of particular programs and instead of reporting regression coefficients (which
others did in the studies cited above), I use a more general approach. Specifically, I use
relative-importance analysis to examine the respective overall proportions of the variation
in earnings that can be attributed to programs, schools and interaction effects. I divide the
estimation specifications by type of degree (undergraduate or professional), gender, and
the amount of time that has elapsed since graduation (six months and two years). The re-
sults of this paper indicate that there is substantially more variation in earnings that can be
attributed to the program variables than to the school variables for both the undergraduate
and the professional-degree graduates. For the undergraduate-degree holders, the programs
accounted for 21.5 percent of the variation in earnings while the schools accounted for just
2.6 percent of the same, a slightly greater than eight-fold difference. For the professional-
degree holders, even though the program variables still explained substantially more of the
earnings variation than the school variables, the difference was not as large as the difference
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for the undergraduate programs. The program variables for the professional-degree holders
accounted for 17.6 percent of the variation in earnings while the schools accounted for 5.3
percent of the same, a slightly greater than three-fold difference. The results for males and
females are similar; in fact, there is no statistically significant difference for schools and
interaction effects in any of the specifications. There is a statistically significant difference
between males and females in terms of the program variables at both the undergraduate and
the professional levels for the six-month data. Gender differences are more pronounced at
the professional-degree level than at the undergraduate level. The variation that can be at-
tributed to the programs at the professional level is 5.4 percentage points greater for males,
while at the undergraduate level this variation is 1.8 percentage points greater for females.
It is essential to highlight that these results are descriptive and not causal because, for exam-
ple, it is likely that students select different programs according to their ability; something
this study cannot address due to data limitations.
In Section 2, I introduce the data. In Section 3, I outline the methodology and the
analysis. In Section 4, I present the results and, in Section 5, I conclude.
3.2 Data
The data used in this paper is a subset of the restricted version of the Ontario University
Graduate Survey (OUGS), which is an annual survey administered by the Ontario Min-
istry of Training, Colleges and Universities (MTCU), in collaboration with the province’s
universities. The survey questionnaire is sent to all Ontario university degree holders two
years after their graduation and asks about their employment outcomes at the intervals of
six months and two years following graduation (Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and
Universities [MTCU], n.d., 2013). The restricted version of the data used in this study has
several advantages over the public-use version. The public-use data only provide median
salaries for a limited number of schools and do not include gender. The restricted data, on
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the other hand, provide the entire salary distribution for the majority of Ontario universi-
ties and include gender. Without access to a dataset that includes all salaries by school, it
would not be possible to compare the variation in earnings that is attributable to programs,
schools and interaction effects. Furthermore, access to the entire salary distribution within
each school-program combination allows for a comparison of the unexplained variation in
earnings on the one hand and the earnings variation attributable to the schools and programs
on the other hand.
The data spans the years 2007 to 2012 and include demographic variables, earnings out-
comes and employment status. The demographic variables are year of graduation, school,
program and gender, and the earnings-outcome variables are the six-month and two-year
salary bins (11 salary bins for each period since graduation). The employment-status vari-
ables are as follows: whether employed, whether offered employment to start at a later date,
whether not employed and not in school, and whether in full- or part-time employment.7
The data are in an aggregate form at the level of the four demographic variables: year of
graduation, program, school and gender. The salaries are in the form of binned data at
the six-month and two-year milestones after graduation. There are 11 bins, one for each
salary group, spaced out by $10,000 starting at $0 and ending with an open-ended group of
>$100,000.8
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the survey respondents across the various de-
mographic variables. Although the analysis in this study aggregates across the graduating
years, the descriptive statistics show the breakdown by graduating year to give a sense of
the relative weights attributable to the results for the various cohorts. The number of obser-
vations is greater for the 2009 to 2012 cohorts relative to the 2007 and 2008 cohorts across
7The survey questionnaire defines full-time employment as 30 or more hours per week (MTCU, n.d.).
8For a more detailed explanation of the data format, refer to Section B.1 of the appendix.
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all genders and degree types. The relative proportions across genders and degree types do
not appear to change significantly over time. Overall, there are more female graduates than
male graduates, with around 66 percent of the total being female; the disparity is especially
pronounced at the professional-degree level where the proportion of graduates is around 74
percent female.
Section B.1.3 of the appendix provides more detailed results for the sample sizes by
individual program, and a summary of the sample sizes across schools. Table B.3 in the
appendix reports the sample sizes for each particular school-program combination by gen-
der and cohort year. The average sample size for any given school-program combination is
between 66 and 90 for females and between 42 and 52 for males depending on the cohort
year. The large sample sizes for the various school-program combinations ensure that there
are enough data for both the direct effects and the interaction effects to acquire statistically
significant results.
Table 3.1: Number of Respondents by Graduating Year, Degree Type and Gender
Graduating Year
Degree Type Gender 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Combined
Programs
Combined Genders 19858 18719 23383 24911 24409 27783 139063
Female 13545 12369 15288 16116 15860 18049 91227
Male 6313 6350 8095 8795 8549 9734 47836
Undergraduate
Combined Genders 17133 16053 19899 21122 20760 23834 118801
Female 11482 10369 12738 13317 13227 15191 76324
Male 5651 5684 7161 7805 7533 8643 42477
Professional
Combined Genders 2725 2666 3484 3789 3649 3949 20262
Female 2063 2000 2550 2799 2633 2858 14903
Male 662 666 934 990 1016 1091 5359
Notes: The descriptive statistics use the six-month data. The two-year data are similar but have slightly
more respondents because fewer program-school groups were dropped from the data due to privacy
suppression; refer to Section B.1.1 f or more details.
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3.3 Methodology and Analysis
Similar previous research studies that examine school and program choices use rich data
along with a large number of regressors. Often, these papers use regression models and re-
port regression coefficients for various school and program characteristics.9 This research
study employs a different approach. Although the OUGS data do not contain many vari-
ables for school and individual characteristics, their main strength is that they contain a
large number of observations for each school-program combination, which makes them
ideal for studying the “overall” effects of schools and programs.10 The approach employed
in this study involves a method called relative-importance analysis, which is closely related
to linear regression models but does not directly report the regression coefficients. The
relative-importance analysis method partitions the sums of the squared deviations from the
mean earnings into the earnings variation attributed to programs, schools, school-program
interactions and the within-group variation (i.e., the unexplained variation).
The OUGS data contain salaries in a binned format, which is not a suitable format
for relative-importance analysis, which requires continuous individual salary observations.
The simplest method of converting the binned salary data into individual observations is to
assume the midpoint value for each interval. For example, in the first bin $0 to $10,000
becomes $5,000 and, if we suppose that there are three people in that interval, then there
would be three observations of $5,000 used in the analysis; this approach is repeated for
all of the bins with the exception of the final one. Indeed, the last bin is open-ended and
has no midpoint value. Furthermore, often the first and last several bins have missing
values due to privacy suppression. Since the applicable privacy regulations suppress some
of these data variables, I cannot determine the exact number of observations within each
of these variables; nevertheless, as a result of the suppression rules, I know that the values
9Refer to the introduction in Section 3.1 which includes the relevant literature.
10In this context, “overall” means that the study is not looking at the effect of any particular school or of
any particular set of program characteristics. Instead, the analysis makes a general comparison of the effect
of programs and schools on earnings.
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are between 1 and 5. In order to deal with these problems, I assume that the samples
of the salaries in the binned data are drawn from a log-normal distribution.11 Therefore
the methodology can be summarized into two main parts: first, the estimation of the log-
normal distributions from the binned data and, second, the relative-importance analysis
which decomposes the variation in the data associated with programs and schools. First, I
estimate a log-normal distribution for each combination of gender, university program and
school, and then I simulate the salary data according to each of those distributions. Second,
I apply the relative-importance algorithm to the simulated salary data. In Section 3.3.2.1,
I describe the relative-importance procedure, which also incorporates the uncertainty from
each step of the algorithm, in order to construct the confidence intervals for the final results.
3.3.1 Distribution Estimation
The salary distributions are estimated from the binned data using the maximum likelihood
method. The salary bins with privacy suppression are treated as a missing-data problem
with constraints. I incorporate the missing bins and the constraints into the likelihood
function.
The likelihood and log-likelihood functions are as follows:
L(θ|data)yr =
Z∑
a=1
1
Z
[ B∏
i=1
p(li,yr ≤ X ≤ ui,yr |θ)ni
( C∑
j=1
M∏
k=1
p(lk,yr ≤ X ≤ uk,yr |θ)ma, j,k
)]
(3.1)
=
1
Z
[ B∏
i=1
[
F(ui,yr |θ)−F(li,yr |θ)
]ni Z∑
a=1
( Ca∑
j=1
γa, j
M∏
k=1
[
F(uk,yr |θ)−F(lk,yr |θ)
]ma, j,k)]
, (3.2)
lnL(θ|data)yr = ln
( 1
Z
)
+
( B∑
i=1
ni ln
[
F(ui,yr |θ)−F(li,yr |θ)
])
+ ln
( Z∑
a=1
Ca∑
j=1
γa, j
M∏
k=1
[
F(uk,yr |θ)−F(lk,yr |θ)
]ma, j,k)
.︸                                                      ︷︷                                                      ︸
f or suppressed data
(3.3)
Also, the log-likelihood is aggregated across the cohorts,
11The basis for the assumption is premised on a visual examination of the bar graphs, which represent the
aggregated salary distribution within the data and are shown in Section B.1.2 of the appendix.
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lnL(θ|data)aggr =
2012∑
yr=2007
lnL(θ|data)yr. (3.4)
Subject to the constraints:
Total(OE) = MIB(OE) + NMIB = EMP + OE ≤ NUMS UR ∀OE, (3.5)
MIB(OE) = Total(OE)−NMIB =
∑
k
ma, j,k ∀OE,a, j. (3.6)
In the constraint equations 3.5 and 3.6, OE represents the number of people who were of-
fered employment at a later date, a figure that is often privacy suppressed. I assume that the
missing values for OE have an equal probability of being between 1 and 5. Let MIB(OE)
represent the total number of observations in the missing bins, which is conditional on OE.
Let EMP be the total number of employed individuals, and let NMIB be the total number
of observations in all of the bins that are not missing. NUMS UR refers to the number of
completed surveys. (In this regard, it is important to acknowledge that not all of the indi-
viduals who complete the survey are employed.)12 Total(OE) represents the total number
of observations in the bins conditional on the unknown OE. For each possible value of OE,
there is a new Total(OE); thus Z represents the number of possible totals of observations
in the bins due to data suppression, and a denotes the index for the total.13 B represents the
number of non-missing bins, and ni represents the number of observations in non-missing
bin i.14 The ui,yr and li,yr are the upper- and lower-bound cut-off points respectively, and
these define the bin intervals.15 F(ui,yr|θ) is the log-normal cdf for the upper boundary of
bin i conditional on the parameters θ = (µ,σ), and F(li,yr|θ) is the same but for the lower
boundary. F(uk,yr|θ) and F(lk,yr|θ) are the analogous cdfs, but for the missing bin k.
12This fact is represented in constraint equation 3.5.
13For example, suppose there are three possible OE values 1, 2 and 3. Furthermore, suppose that
Total(OE) = Total(1) = 10, Total(2) = 11, Total(3) = 12. Then, Z = 3 because there are three different totals
10,11 and 12.
14NMIB is the sum of all ni, NMIB =
∑
i ni.
15The ui,yr and li,yr depend on the year because of an inflation adjustment (with the base year being 2010).
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Given the number of missing bins M and the corresponding MIB(OE), the estimation
takes into consideration the many possible sets of permutations. For example, if there
are two missing bins, M = 2 and MIB(OE) = 4, then there are two ways to add up to 4,
with one permutation for the first way, {(2,2)}, and two permutations for the second way,
{(3,1), (1,3)}.
Let Ca be the total number of possible permutations; this combines the permutations
that all add up in different ways to the same total, Total(OE).16 Each set of permutations is
not equally likely, and therefore there needs to be a weight factor γ j,a for each permutation
j,a.17 The weight factor for each permutation within a set that adds up to the observations in
the bins in a particular way is going to be the same — that is, (1,3) will have the same weight
factor as (3,1). Nevertheless, the weight factor may vary across the different ways of adding
up to the same total. In other words, the weight factor is not the same for (2,2) and (1,3). For
(2,2), the weight factor is 6 and, for (1,3), the weight factor is 4.18 The privacy-suppressed
observations are denoted by ma, j,k, which represents the possible number of observations
for part a, in bin k, in permutation j. In equation 3.4, the distribution estimation aggregates
across the graduating cohort years, and so the final log-likelihood is the sum of the log-
likelihoods for all of the years.
3.3.2 Relative-Importance Analysis: Variance Decomposition
In the context of this paper, the goal of the variance decomposition is to determine whether
the schools or the programs in general have a greater effect on their graduates’ earnings.
16For the example set out above that adds up to Total(OE) = 4, Ca = 3, because the number of elements
across all of the permutations adds up to 3, it follows that
{
{(2,2)}, {(3,1), (1,3)}
}
.
17The weight factor γ is as follows:
γ =
M∏
i=1
(
si
qi
)
=
M∏
i=1
si!
qi!(si−qi)!
where si =
∑M
j=i q j, qi is the number of observations in bin i, and M is the number of missing bins.
18Refer to Section B.2 in the appendix for a detailed example outlining how the weight factor calculation
works.
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The starting point is the OLS model which is as follows:
Y = ln(Y∗) = α+
∑
j
X jβ j︸   ︷︷   ︸
Programs
+
∑
k
Xkβk︸   ︷︷   ︸
S chools
+
∑
j
∑
k
X j×Xkβ jk︸                ︷︷                ︸
Interactions
+ε (3.7)
where Y is the natural log of the annual salary, and X j and Xk are the indicator variables
denoting program j and school k. Finally, β j and βk are the regression coefficients for pro-
gram j and school k. In order to determine the effect on the dependent variable (earnings)
of one factor relative to another, we have to establish a methodology to decompose the total
variation in the data. The total variation in the data is decomposed into the parts explained
by the observable factors in the regression, and into the unexplained parts.
This can be done using a standard sum-of-squares decomposition: Total Sum of Squares
(TSS) = Explained Sum of Squares (ESS) + Residual Sum of Squares (RSS),
∑
i
(yi− ȳ)2︸       ︷︷       ︸
TS S
=
∑
i
(ŷi− ȳ)2︸       ︷︷       ︸
ES S
+
∑
i
(yi− ŷi)2︸        ︷︷        ︸
RS S
=
∑
i
(
∑
j
xi, jβ̂ j +
∑
k
xi,kβ̂k +
∑
j
∑
k
X j×Xkβ̂ jk − ȳ)2 +
∑
i
ε2i (3.8)
where for observation i, yi denotes the simulated salary from the log-normal distribu-
tion, ŷi is the predicted OLS estimate and ȳ is the estimated overall mean salary. Equation
3.8 can be used to form the coefficient of determination R2 = ES STS S , which is a percentage of
the variation in earnings that can be explained by the independent variables in the regres-
sion model. In order to decompose the R2 further by incorporating multiple explanatory
variables into the model, the analysis uses sequential sums of squares. First, the model
is estimated with one covariate, and R21 is calculated; then the model is estimated with a
second covariate, and R22 is calculated. The amount of variation explained by the first co-
variate is then said to be R21, and the amount of variation explained by the second covariate
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is the difference, R22 −R
2
1. The main problem with this approach in an unbalanced design
is that the order of adding the regressors matters.19 In this case, since I am interested in
programs and schools as groups, there are two possibilities, namely (i) programs + schools
and (ii) schools + programs. For (i), indicator variables representing each program enter
first into the regression equation (the order of the individual program-indicator variables
does not matter because the total sum of squares for the programs will be the same). After
the last program-indicator variable enters the equation, the school-indicator variables enter
in a similar manner. The same applies for (ii) but in the reverse order. At this point in the
analysis, the two possible orderings are yielding two different results. To resolve this issue,
I use the LMG approach, as described by Grömping (2007).20 The LMG approach involves
the arithmetic average over the sum of squares for the orderings (i) and (ii).21
In summary, the results of the above-described procedure yield the total sum of squares
(TSS) and the explained sum of squares (ESS). The explained sum of squares (ESS) are
further divided into their respective components, sum of squares attributed to programs,
schools, and interactions of schools and programs; each of these are denoted as ES S avgprg,
ES S avgsch , ES S
avg
prg,sch, respectively.
22 The leftover variation is the residual sum of squares
(RSS).
The analysis uses the following equations to determine the percentage of variation for
each component:
% Explained by Programs =
ES S avgprg
TS S
,
19An unbalanced design refers to the different sample sizes across groups.
20The LMG approach (as cited by Grömping, 2007) was named after and initially introduced by Linde-
man, Merenda, and Gold (1980).
21The sum of squares for programs from (i) is averaged with the sum of squares for programs from (ii).
This process is repeated for the schools and for the interaction effects. There are no mixed orders between
schools and programs, such as Sch1 + Prg1 + Sch2 + Prg2. Therefore, there are only two orderings — in
this case, program + school and school + program. Interactions always are the last elements to enter into the
regressions.
22ES S avgprg, ES S
avg
sch , ES S
avg
prg,sch are averaged over the orderings (i) and (ii).
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% Explained by Schools =
ES S avgsch
TS S
,
% Explained by Interactions =
ES S avgprg,sch
TS S
,
% Unexplained =
RS S
TS S
.
3.3.2.1 Confidence Intervals
This procedure accounts for the uncertainty that is associated with the salary distribution
estimates. Let µi and σ̃i be the log-normal distribution parameters for group i, and let Σi
be the corresponding variance-covariance matrix estimated from the procedure in Section
3.3.1.23 I perform the following steps in order to acquire the standard errors:
1. For each log-normal distribution i, I randomly sample 1,000 values of µi and σ̃i from
the bivariate normal distribution, N (Υi,Σi), where Υi =
 µiσ̃i
 and
Σi =
 σ
2
µ,i σµ,σ̃,i
σσ̃,µ,i σ
2
σ̃,i
. This results in 1,000 datasets of µ and σ̃ parameters, and thus
represents all of the groups.
2. For each set from (1), I simulate the individual salaries for each group, weighted
proportionally to the number of people in the original survey. Then I scale the entire
set by 5 in order to increase the sample size of the smallest group.24
3. I apply the relative-importance procedure outlined in Section 3.3.2, which results
in 1,000 estimates for each percentage-of-variation parameter (i.e., a parameter for
23In this case, a “group” refers to a particular combination of: gender, program, school. An example might
be a female graduate from the humanities program at the University of Toronto.
24The smallest group is in the six-month data, and increases from 6 to 30 when scaled by five; however,
the two-year data are scaled by five as well.
41
CHAPTER 3. WHAT HAS THE GREATER EFFECT ON EARNINGS, THE UNIVERSITY YOU
ATTEND OR THE DEGREE PROGRAM YOU PURSUE?
programs, schools and interactions).25 These estimates form the basis of the point
estimates and of the 95 percent confidence intervals outlined in the results section.26
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimated Salaries
Table 3.2 reports the estimated median salaries across the various undergraduate programs,
and Table 3.3 reports the estimated median salaries for the various professional-degree
programs; both tables report salaries at the six-month and two-year milestones following
graduation respectively. The tables show an increase in salaries from six months to two
years after graduation for every program. The undergraduate programs with the greatest
increase in median salary were food science and nutrition, kinesiology and journalism,
which all increased by more than 25 percent. However, these programs also had the lowest
median salaries at six months following graduation.
The programs described in the tables are ordered from the highest earning to the lowest
earning. The high-earning programs tend to be STEM-related programs or to require many
STEM subjects.27 For example, many high-earning undergraduate programs are health
related, including pharmacy and nursing, and mathematics related, including engineering,
computer science and business/commerce. Similarly, high-earning professional degrees
tend to be health related, including dentistry and optometry.
There is a substantial disparity among median salaries across undergraduate programs.
There are many programs for which the median salaries are in the $40,000 to $50,000
range; examples are engineering and computer science. Moreover, there are many pro-
grams for which the median salaries are in the $20,000 to $30,000 range; examples are
25I repeat all of the steps for the six-month and two-year data.
26The average is the point estimate, and the percentile placements of the ordered values form the confi-
dence intervals.
27STEM stands for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
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the humanities and kinesiology. The professional degrees mostly yield higher salaries than
the undergraduate degrees, which is a reasonable outcome given the fact that they also re-
quire more education. Some exceptions are the education programs (teacher training) and
theology, which would be at the lower end of the undergraduate salary spectrum.28
28Refer to Chapter 1 of this thesis for the reasons why teacher salaries are so low.
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Table 3.2: Estimated Median Salaries by Undergraduate Programs at Six Months and Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation
(2010 $) Median Salary (95 % C.I.) %∆ (6 Mos N Sample29
6 Months 2 Years to 2 Yrs) 6 Mos 2 Yrs
Pharmacy 76006 84896 12% 588 598
(69735–82998) (79341–90932)
Nursing 52775 55172 5% 5548 5813
(50675–55006) (53061–57437)
Engineering 49780 55578 12% 7505 8539
(47583–52134) (53301–58069)
Computer Science 47997 54421 13% 1687 1869
(43703–52948) (49658–59851)
Therapy and Rehab. 44683 49377 11% 96 95
(41013–48732) (44907–54361)
Mathematics 40778 46258 13% 1089 1385
(36845–45907) (42037–51307)
Business/Commerce 40044 46741 17% 14058 15136
(38301–41890) (44798–48789)
Forestry 35957 41901 17% 20 25
(29454–43896) (35301–49735)
Health Professions 34231 38476 12% 1868 2106
(30394–38736) (34600–42967)
Other Arts and Science 32413 35893 11% 3344 3644
(28511–37134) (31680–40959)
Archit. & Lands. Archit. 30302 31545 4% 402 319
(25911–35659) (25932–40322)
Physical Sciences 27005 28916 7% 698 876
(21018–34970) (22985–36569)
Journalism 26336 33309 26% 345 393
(23077–30587) (29946–37173)
Social Sciences 25995 31320 20% 22466 25261
(24713–27366) (29899–32825)
Agr. and Bio. Sciences 23183 28375 22% 4577 5027
(20792–25991) (25465–31756)
Food Science/Nutrition 22787 30161 32% 884 1104
(20659–25376) (27589–33238)
Kin./Recr./Phys. Ed. 22675 29141 29% 3208 3619
(19926–25910) (25930–32827)
Humanities 22044 27164 23% 10772 12456
(20441–23845) (25388–29125)
Fine and Applied Arts 19858 23664 19% 3790 4299
(17668–22577) (21066–26863)
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Table 3.3: Estimated Median Salaries by Professional Programs at Six Months and Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation
(2010 $) Median Salary (95 % C.I.) %∆ (6 Mos N Sample
6 Months 2 Years to 2 Yrs) 6 Mos 2 Yrs
Dentistry 109415 200440 83% 163 155
(71633–178922) (85113–694340)
Optometry 80043 103330 29% 188 188
(68539–93620) (87069–125218)
Veterinary Medicine 63513 67212 6% 253 238
(59809–67565) (63058–71729)
Medicine 54177 63586 17% 1006 1069
(51356–57262) (58356–70457)
Law 53721 64943 21% 2487 2535
(49636–58180) (59681–70723)
Education 29688 35494 20% 12815 14051
(Teacher Training) (28237–31231) (33960–37111)
Theology 27665 29981 8% 83 102
(19400–40669) (22974–40289)
3.4.2 Employment Rates and the Proportion of Survey Respondents
that Acquired Jobs
The estimation of the salary distributions and the subsequent relative-importance analysis
exclude unemployed graduates, as well as those individuals who were not included in the
labour force. The average employment rate was 88 percent for undergraduate-degree hold-
ers and 90 percent for professional-degree holders at the six-month milestone following
graduation. The employment rates were slightly higher at the two-year milestone following
graduation; at this point, the average employment rate was 93 percent for undergraduate-
degree holders, and 95 percent for professional-degree holders. The employment rates were
relatively high and similar across all programs, and thus the exclusion of unemployed grad-
uates should not have a significant impact on the results. The complete list of employment
29The N sample refers to the number of employed graduates and, as a result of privacy suppression, it is
calculated as the midpoint between the minimum and the maximum possible number of employed individuals.
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rates by program can be found in Tables B.29 and B.30 of Appendix Section B.2.3.30
The proportion of survey respondents who found a job, denoted as EMPSURV, is de-
termined through a calculation that is slightly different from the calculation that is used
to determine the employment rate because it also considers graduates who were not in the
labour force (usually because they went back to school). The resulting values of the EMP-
SURV rate are similar to the employment rates for professional-degree holders because it
is less likely that those graduates will continue their studies. However, among individu-
als who completed an undergraduate degree, the EMPSURV rate results vary substantially
from the employment rates for certain programs. For example, fewer than 60 percent of
survey respondents from the physical sciences, the agricultural and biological sciences, and
the health professions had found a job at the six-month milestone after graduation. The six-
month employment rates were much higher for these programs, namely 83 percent for the
physical sciences, 85 percent for the agricultural and biological sciences, and 86 percent
for the health professions. For those in the labour force, 88 percent had found a job at
the six-month milestone after graduation, while only 70 percent of survey respondents had
found a job at that point in time.
It is not clear whether the exclusion of graduates who were not in the labour force biases
the results one way or the other. The implicit assumption is that the graduates who were
not in the labour force would draw their salary from the same distributions as those who
were in the labour force.31 For the results to be unbiased, this assumption would have to be
true.
30The definition of the employment rate is the proportion of graduates who found (or who were offered
employment to begin at a later date in) a full- or part-time job conditional on searching for a job and not being
in school. Refer to Section B.2.3. for the detailed calculations.
31In other words, the assumption seems to contend that the only difference between the graduates is that
some of them chose not to be in the labour force.
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3.4.3 Relative-Importance Analysis
I estimate 24 different specifications of the model. There are four program-group cate-
gories based on the type of degree: combined programs, undergraduate programs, profes-
sional programs and professional programs other than dentistry — also denoted as pro-
fessional (no dentistry). Within each program category, I estimate the specifications of
the model based on gender (male, female, and combined genders) and based on two pe-
riods after graduation (six months and two years). The combined-genders category refers
to a specification in which the genders were combined in the estimate. The combined-
programs category consolidates all of the available programs in the data and thus includes
both undergraduate- and professional-degree programs. The undergraduate category only
includes programs that lead to a bachelor’s degree and do not require a prior degree as a
prerequisite for admission.32 The professional category includes programs that require pre-
vious post-secondary education as a necessary condition for admission. The professional
(no dentistry) category excludes dentistry because the estimated values for that category
are less reliable due to the small sample sizes as well as due to the large number of ob-
servations falling into the open-ended salary bin (>$100,000). This is evident from the
wide confidence intervals for the dentistry median salaries as set out in Table 3.3 of Section
3.4.1.33
Table 3.4 reports the results for the six-month data, and Table 3.5 reports the results for
the two-year data.34 I start with the most straightforward estimates which include combined
genders and combined programs together. For the six-month data denoted as specification
(A1), the programs account for 21.8 percent of the variation in earnings while the schools
account for only 2.1 percent of the same; this disparity is slightly over 10 times the dif-
32The education programs (namely teacher training) are in the professional-degree category. Although
there are education-degree programs that admit students straight from high school, these programs are still
predominantly offered at the graduate level.
33For the two-year data, the range of the confidence interval for the median dentistry salary is $609,227.
34The specifications are labelled by letters for each row (A–H) and by numbers for each column (1–3). For
example, (A3) refers to the specification that includes “combined programs” for males using the six-month
data.
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ference. The interactions account for 2.9 percent of the earnings variation which is similar
to the school variables.35 The total explained variation in earnings is 26.8 percent, which
means that just under three-quarters of the variation is due to unexplained factors; the lat-
ter might presumably be attributable to various individual characteristics such as ability,
personality and workforce connections. Similarly, for the two-year data denoted as specifi-
cation (E1), the programs explain 18.9 percent of the earnings variation, while the schools
explain 2.5 percent of the same, which is only around eight times the difference (in com-
parison with the six-month case and the scenario of 10 times the difference).
The 22 other specifications examine the earnings variation for each combination of
degree type and gender for both the six-month and the two-year data. Separate regressions
were performed for females and males because of the gender differences in the numbers
of people within the programs, and because of the gender differences in the salaries of the
graduates from each program. Overall, 66 percent of the graduates are female; however,
there are also large gender disparities in the number of graduates from certain programs;
for example, there are 5,701 female nurses and only 398 male nurses, while there are 8,219
male engineers and only 206 female engineers. The differences in the program mix across
genders may potentially affect the levels of earnings variation that can be attributed to
programs. For instance, a skewed proportion of individuals towards the lower- or higher-
paying programs would produce less earnings variation than an equal number of individuals
in those programs.
Furthermore, there are gender differences in salaries across programs. Males earn more
than females in all programs except for computer science, the health professions and jour-
nalism, and they do so at both the six-month and the two-year milestones after graduation.36
The gender differences in salary may in part be due to the gender differences in part-time
35The convention in this type of analysis is to examine the main effects first and then always to add the
interaction term at the end of the process to examine the leftover variation that is not accounted for by the
main effects.
36In medicine the salaries are similar, males earn slightly more at six months since graduation, and females
earn slightly more at two years after graduation.
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rates. Table B.33 of Appendix Section B.2.5 shows that the part-time job rates are higher
for females for both undergraduate and professional degrees. Sections B.2.2 and B.2.5
show median salaries and part-time rates by programs and gender. Programs with a higher
proportion of part-time earners tend to have lower median salaries. A skewed proportion
of individuals at the lower salary level may reduce the earnings variance of that particular
program.
The notable result across all specifications, (A1) to (H3), is that the programs account
for the majority of the explained variation when compared with the schools and the in-
teractions. A separate examination of the undergraduate and professional-degree groups
for the six-month data reveals that the program variables affect earnings to a greater ex-
tent for members of the undergraduate group than for members of the professional-degree
group. For specification (B) which uses the six-month data, the undergraduate programs
account for 21.5 percent of the variation, while the schools account for 2.6 percent of the
variation, which is slightly greater than eight times the difference. However, professional-
degree programs account for 17.6 percent of the variation, while the schools account for 5.3
percent of the same, which is only slightly greater than three times the difference. When
comparing the six-month data specifications across genders, (A–D, 2–3), there are no sta-
tistically significant differences for the schools and the interaction effects; however, there
are statistically significant differences for the programs for both the undergraduate and the
professional degrees.37 For the undergraduate group specifications, (B2) and (B3), the pro-
grams account for 20.7 percent of the variation for the females and for 18.9 percent of the
variation for the males, a difference of only 1.8 percentage points. For the professional
group specifications, (C2) and (C3), the programs account for 15.2 percent of the variation
for females and for 20.6 percent of the variation for males, a slightly greater difference
of 5.4 percentage points in the opposite direction when compared with the undergraduate
group.
37(A–D,2–3) refers to specifications in rows A to D and columns two and three of Table 3.4.
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The pattern for the two-year data is similar to that for the six-month data in that the
programs account for substantially more earnings variation than both the schools and in-
teractions in every specification. The main notable difference is that, for the undergraduate
group, the program variables explain less of the variation within the two-year data than
within the six-month data. The interaction and the school variables account for roughly
the same amount of earnings variation in all of the specifications for the undergraduates
across the six-month and the two-year data. Another difference between the results from
the six-month and the two-year data is that the programs account for less of the earnings
variation for undergraduate degrees than for professional degrees in the two-year data, a
result that is the opposite of that for the six-month data. For (F1), undergraduate programs
account for 17.8 percent of the variation in earnings, while for (G1), professional programs
account for 19.4 percent of this variation. However, this anomaly might be attributable to
the dentistry program because the dentistry salary distribution estimates are substantially
noisier for the six-month data than for the two-year data. From (H1), the specification that
excludes dentistry, programs account for 16.2 percent of the variation in earnings, which
is lower than the 17.8 percent for undergraduate programs from the two-year data. The
patterns across genders for the two-year data are similar to those for the six-month data
with the main difference being that there is no statistically significant gender difference for
undergraduate programs. When comparing specifications (F2) and (F3), they are almost
identical.
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Table 3.4: Relative-Importance Analysis for Salaries at Six Months
Type of Degree Regressors
Gender
1) Combined Genders 2) Female 3) Male
Proportion of Earnings Variation : (95 % C. I.)
(A) Combined Programs 0.218 0.208 0.202
Programs (0.213–0.223) (0.203–0.213) (0.193–0.212)
Schools 0.021 0.021 0.027
(0.020–0.023) (0.019–0.023) (0.023–0.030)
Programs × Schools 0.029 0.032 0.038
(0.027–0.032) (0.029–0.035) (0.033–0.045)
Total R2 0.268 0.262 0.267
(0.263–0.273) (0.256–0.268) (0.257–0.279)
(B) Undergraduate Programs 0.215 0.207 0.189
(0.210–0.220) (0.201–0.212) (0.181–0.199)
Schools 0.026 0.027 0.032
(0.024–0.028) (0.025–0.030) (0.028–0.035)
Programs × Schools 0.029 0.032 0.038
(0.026–0.032) (0.029–0.036) (0.032–0.046)
Total R2 0.270 0.266 0.259
(0.265–0.276) (0.259–0.273) (0.248–0.271)
(C) Professional Programs 0.176 0.152 0.206
(0.165–0.188) (0.141–0.164) (0.179–0.235)
Schools 0.053 0.053 0.059
(0.048–0.060) (0.047–0.060) (0.047–0.072)
Programs × Schools 0.008 0.007 0.015
(0.005–0.013) (0.005–0.011) (0.005–0.034)
Total R2 0.238 0.213 0.279
(0.224–0.252) (0.200–0.226) (0.245–0.315)
(D) Professional Programs 0.157 0.137 0.175
(No Dentistry) (0.148–0.167) (0.128–0.147) (0.154–0.196)
Schools 0.054 0.054 0.060
(0.048–0.061) (0.048–0.061) (0.048–0.073)
Programs × Schools 0.006 0.007 0.009
(0.004–0.009) (0.004–0.010) (0.004–0.015)
Total R2 0.218 0.198 0.243
(0.207–0.230) (0.186–0.211 (0.218–0.268)
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Table 3.5: Relative-Importance Analysis for Salaries at Two Years
Type of Degree Regressors
Gender
1) Combined Genders 2) Female 3) Male
Proportion of Earnings Variation : (95 % C. I.)
(E) Combined Programs 0.189 0.174 0.182
Programs (0.184–0.195) (0.168–0.181) (0.172–0.193)
Schools 0.018 0.017 0.021
(0.016–0.019) (0.015–0.019) (0.018–0.024)
Programs × Schools 0.025 0.030 0.034
(0.023–0.028) (0.027–0.035) (0.028–0.042)
Total R2 0.233 0.221 0.237
(0.227–0.239) (0.214–0.231) (0.226–0.250)
(F) Undergraduate Programs 0.178 0.162 0.161
(0.173–0.182) (0.157–0.167) (0.153–0.170)
Schools 0.022 0.021 0.025
(0.020–0.023) (0.019–0.023) (0.022–0.029)
Programs × Schools 0.024 0.027 0.034
(0.021–0.026) (0.024–0.030) (0.028–0.044)
Total R2 0.223 0.210 0.221
(0.218–0.228) (0.204–0.216) (0.210–0.233)
(G) Professional Programs 0.194 0.167 0.235
(0.174–0.216) (0.146–0.191) (0.195–0.281)
Schools 0.054 0.057 0.055
(0.048–0.060) (0.050–0.064) (0.043–0.067)
Programs × Schools 0.009 0.016 0.013
(0.004–0.021) (0.006–0.043) (0.006–0.026)
Total R2 0.257 0.240 0.303
(0.236–0.282) (0.212–0.285) (0.260–0.350)
(H) Professional Programs 0.162 0.139 0.186
(No Dentistry) (0.152–0.172) (0.129–0.150) (0.165–0.209)
Schools 0.055 0.058 0.055
(0.049–0.060) (0.052–0.065) (0.042–0.069)
Programs × Schools 0.006 0.007 0.011
(0.004–0.009) (0.004–0.012) (0.006–0.018)
Total R2 0.223 0.205 0.252
(0.211–0.235) (0.193–0.219) (0.224–0.282)
Figure 3.1 summarizes Tables 3.4 and 3.5, which make it clear that the degree programs
account for substantially more of the variation in earnings than the schools. Further, the
overlapping error bars make it easy to see that there are no statistically significant differ-
ences between the genders for most of the variables, except for the two-year earnings for
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the program degrees, where the earnings variation for females is slightly lower than for the
combined-genders category.
Figure 3.1: Relative-Importance Analysis: Combined Programs at Six Months and Two Years
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I examine whether the school or the program choice has a more substan-
tial impact on the salaries of recent university graduates. In particular, I use a relative-
importance analysis method, which involves a sum-of-squares decomposition to analyze
the differences in the variation in salaries across programs, schools and school-program
interactions, as well as to examine any unexplained variation.
The results show that the program variables account for substantially more of the varia-
tion in earnings than the school variables, and that is the case in both the undergraduate and
the professional-degree groups. For the undergraduate level, with respect to salaries at the
six-month milestone after graduation and at the two-year milestone after graduation, the
53
CHAPTER 3. WHAT HAS THE GREATER EFFECT ON EARNINGS, THE UNIVERSITY YOU
ATTEND OR THE DEGREE PROGRAM YOU PURSUE?
program variables accounts for about six to eight times more of the variation in earnings
than that which is accounted for by the school variables. Moreover, with respect to the
professional level at the six-month and the two-year milestones after graduation, the pro-
grams account for about three to four times more of the earnings variation than the schools.
The school-program interaction effects account for roughly the same amount of variation in
earnings as the school variables at the undergraduate level, or for around 2.1 to 3.8 percent
of the variation in the same. At the professional-degree level, the school-program interac-
tion effects on the variation in earnings were much lower than those of the school variables,
or were around 0.6 to 1.5 percent.
It is also important to highlight first the fact that between around 70 to 80 percent of
the variation is unexplained, and second the likelihood that at least some portion is at-
tributable to individual characteristics, such as personality, intelligence, and talent. The
results provided in this paper may be useful to prospective university students in differing
ways, depending on their personal and professional goals. For example, at the undergrad-
uate level, if the student has not yet selected the program that he or she is going to take,
then any school should be as good as any other. However, if the individual has his or her
heart set on a specific program, then the interaction effects (which are virtually equal to
the school effects for undergraduates) suggest that there are some program-school com-
binations that require closer attention during the decision-making process. Moreover, the
results do not specify any direction, and some program-school combinations may yield
below- or above-average earnings. It conceivable that some schools specialize in particular
subjects and produce excellent graduates, while other schools — even those with an other-
wise strong reputation — might be weak in those subjects. This study is descriptive and,
hence, there also could be other explanations. For example, a particular program could be
offered at a school in an area of the province where the employment and overall economic
opportunities are better; this scenario would make it more likely that graduates from that
school would receive a higher salary than graduates from equivalent or similar programs
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offered at schools in areas with fewer opportunities. Finally, if individuals would like to
maximize their earnings, they should mostly be concerned with their choice of program.
We should interpret the results for the professional-degree level with more caution. Even
though program choice matters to an extent that is substantially greater than school choice
as a result of the fact an undergraduate degree is generally an admission requirement for a
professional program, many students might have limited their options at a premature stage
of their post-secondary academic career. For example, if an individual took a humanities
undergraduate degree, he or she might have a difficult time gaining acceptance into medi-
cal school; in that sense, program choice takes on a different meaning. Given the fact that
program choices are more limited at the professional-degree level, the results are even less
conclusive because the school decision might matter to an even greater or an even lesser
extent than the result might imply. The number of school choices at the professional level
might also be limited because some programs are only offered by a few schools; for exam-
ple, in the data only two schools offer dentistry, and optometry and veterinary medicine are
only available at a single school.
In Canada, the post-secondary education system appears to be more standardized than
in the United States. Canada has a higher proportion of relatively large, publicly funded
schools, and the expectation is for the greater homogeneity in the system to produce a
smaller amount of variation in salaries that can be attributed to schools. Since the popular
culture in the United States often emphasizes the role of prestigious schools in being “bet-
ter,” as evidenced by the recent bribery scandal, some people will go to great lengths to
gain admission (Nadworny & Kamenetz, 2019). However, it is not entirely clear whether
these differences in prestige translate into differences across salaries.
In the U.S., “getting into a top program” can have a drastically different meaning than in
Canada. The presence of "Ivy League" schools establishes a more explicit benchmark and
aspirational standard for the prestige of U.S. institutions. The Canadian university system
is generally much more homogeneous than that of the U.S., and this is the case according
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to several measures. In the United States, the College Scorecard website hosted by the U.S.
Department of Education lists 2,441 accredited institutions that offer a four-year bachelor’s
program, of which 692 are public, 1,340 are private non-profit, and 409 are private for-
profit; around 59 percent of these institutions have fewer than 2,000 undergraduates (U.S.
Department of Education [DoED], n.d.).
On the other hand, in Canada, there are currently 96 universities, of which 86 offer
undergraduate degrees and of which only around 21 percent have fewer than 2,000 under-
graduates Universities Canada (UC, n.d.). Moreover, the relatively standardized definitions
for the categories of programs in the data make it relatively convenient to compare them
across schools.
This paper emphasizes the finding that, since schools do not explain a large propor-
tion of the variation in earnings, students should not feel disadvantaged if they are unable
to attend the one of the most prestigious institutions. This is important because an unin-
formed decision about either the school or the degree program has the potential to be costly
for students if there is an academic mismatch in terms of the students having overly opti-
mistic expectations about their performance and grades in a particular school or program.
Many students who struggle academically have to switch their program and school or even
drop out altogether — an outcome that is likely to be expensive and demoralizing. For
instance, T. R. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012) found that, when students initially
enter university, they on average have inflated expectations for their grade performance,
and those who drop out often do so because they learn about their actual academic ability.
Further, Astorne-Figari and Speer (2019) found that students with low grades not only tend
to switch programs but also tend to switch into less-related programs depending on how
low their grades are.38
38“Less related” refers to the similarity in the curriculum. Some subjects are more similar than others; for
example, accounting and business are more related than accounting and English.
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Chapter 4
How Much Do Teachers Earn Outside
the Public Education System? Evidence
from Ontario, Canada
4.1 Introduction
Previous research has shown that high-quality teachers are a prerequisite for student achieve-
ment (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). Therefore, it is of utmost policy relevance to attract
and retain the highest-quality teachers, and one way to do this is by gaining and imple-
menting an understanding of the ways in which teachers make labour-supply decisions.
Economists are typically interested in the factors that teachers consider when they make
decisions whether to enter, stay in or exit the teacher workforce. Ordinarily, the modelling
of these decisions requires the teacher or the prospective teacher to compare the teaching
salary to the salary that he or she would have received if he had chosen a different career
path. Thus, a fundamental aspect of understanding these decisions is comprised of the op-
portunity cost of teaching. The main goal of this study is to estimate the outside options
of recent Ontario teachers’ college graduates from the 2007 to 2013 graduating cohorts.1
This study uses data provided by the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities. The views ex-
pressed in this study are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry.
1In this study, a “teacher” is a graduate who has found a permanent Ontario public-school teaching job.
On the other hand, “non-teaching option/job” and “outside option/job” refer to any position other than that of
a permanent Ontario public-school teacher (including a private-sector teacher and a non-permanent public-
school teacher; as well as non-teaching positions).
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Furthermore, I estimate public-school teaching salaries of members of these cohorts and
compare them with the non-teaching salaries of other members of the same.
Little is known about this opportunity cost or about the outside options because it is
difficult to obtain suitable data. Typically, in order to estimate this opportunity cost, longi-
tudinal data are needed; the gathering of these data would require the researcher to follow
the teachers over an extended period of time and to potentially observe them in alternative
occupations. Another issue is that, since the main objective is to understand how much
teachers would earn in a non-teaching position, the ideal data for this estimation would
contain many teachers’ college graduates who randomly chose a non-teaching job. In re-
ality, most teachers’ college graduates work as teachers for an extended period, and those
who exit the profession often leave the workforce altogether for family reasons; this leaves
very few opportunities to observe teachers in alternative occupations (T. R. Stinebrickner,
2002).
One of the contributions of this paper is based on the fact that I take advantage of
a unique environment in Ontario, Canada, where, instead of the more prevalent context
in which there are more available jobs than qualified teachers (i.e, a teacher shortage),
the teacher labour market has experienced a surplus since around 2005. As is stated in
Chapter 1, the probability of a 2006 Ontario teachers’ college graduate acquiring a full-time
teaching position in the Ontario public school system in the first year was around 14 percent
— a figure that had fallen to under 5 percent by 2013 for that year’s graduating cohort.
The one benefit of this environment is that, due to these low employment rates in public
schools, the salary distribution of Ontario teachers’ college graduates is mostly comprised
of individuals who are not full-time public-school teachers. Moreover, the examination of
this opportunity cost over time as it became increasingly challenging to acquire a teaching
position can provide insight into the relationship between the teaching employment rate
and the non-teaching income of teachers’ college graduates.
Even though the Ontario teacher labour market has many of the characteristics of the
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ideal environment, as mentioned above, in regard to examining teachers’ outside options,
access to suitable data still comes with certain challenges. For example, traditional Cana-
dian labour datasets, such as the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and the
National Graduate Survey (NGS), do not contain enough teachers.2 I overcome this issue
by utilizing four separate types of data source, and one strength of these data is that they
are recent, as they pertain to the graduating cohorts of 2007 to 2013 — an ideal time frame
given the fact that it coincides with the teacher-surplus labour market.3
The first data were drawn from the Ontario University Graduate Survey (OUGS), which
is a restricted-access dataset administered by the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and
Universities. The data contain salaries at six months and two years after graduation for male
and female education-program graduates who are working in teaching and non-teaching
positions. The main benefit of these data is that they are focused on Ontario alone and
therefore contain relatively large sample sizes for graduates of Ontario teacher-education
programs.
For the data referred to hereunder as “teacher data,” I created a new and unique dataset
by web scraping, processing and combining teacher profiles from the Ontario public regis-
ter of individuals who are licensed to teach in Ontario.4 The data are used to determine how
likely it was for teachers’ college graduates to acquire a teaching job. One of the strengths
of these data is that they encompass almost the entire population of teachers in Ontario and
exclude only those teachers who did not register with the Ontario College of Teachers.5
For this study, I specifically created a third set of data, referred to as “salary-grid data,”
by collecting and combining salary information from Ontario teachers’ collective agree-
ments. These data were used in combination with the “teacher data” to determine the
2The popular U.S. National Longitudinal Study of 1972 (NLS-72) over-sampled teachers in order to
overcome this problem. To the best of my knowledge, there are no Canadian datasets that do this.
3Note that this is true with the exception of the QECO data which are only valid for the 2015 year;
however, I assume that they are also valid for the years in the study. Refer to Section 4.2 for more details.
4The teacher profiles are publicly available on the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT) website (OCT,
2019b).
5The Ontario College of Teachers regulates and certifies all public-school teachers in the province. Refer
to Chapter 1 for more details related to teaching-profession requirements in Ontario.
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number of teachers’ college graduates who had found a teaching job as well as these indi-
viduals’ teaching salary. To the best of my knowledge, up until the present, there are no
other sets of Ontario teacher salary data that contain a comprehensive collection of public-
school salaries across the various qualification levels. The fourth type of data source comes
from two Qualifications Evaluation Council of Ontario (QECO) documents. The first docu-
ment contains regulations that outline the ways in which teaching experience and education
level translate into teachers’ qualification category placement in the teaching salary grids.
For example, there are 10 principal ways of qualifying for the A2 qualification category,
such as completing a four-year undergraduate degree or a three-year degree with at least a
second-class standing.6 The second document contains QECO presentation materials that
provide information about how likely it was for a teacher to be in particular qualification
categories. These “teacher data” in combination with the “salary-grid data” and the QECO
documents were then used to determine the salaries of the teachers’ college graduates who
had acquired a permanent teaching position in the Ontario public school system. The in-
formation pertaining to the teaching salaries of Ontario teachers’ college graduates were
then combined with the OUGS salary dataset, which contains the salaries of teachers’ col-
lege graduates who work as a public-school teacher and the salaries of those who work
in a position outside the Ontario public school system, to estimate the salaries for just the
outside-option jobs.
The most closely related literature examines the ways in which non-teaching salaries
(or relative teaching salaries) contribute to teacher mobility — in terms of entering and ex-
iting the teaching profession (i.e., starting a family), as well as switching occupations. For
instance, Manski (1987) found that increasing teachers’ relative earnings attracts a greater
number of both low- and high-ability students, and Hanushek and Pace (1995) found that
teachers’ relative earnings have little effect on who becomes a teacher. Dolton and Make-
6Qualification categories range from A1 to A4, with A1 being the lowest qualification category with the
lowest salary level and A4 being the highest qualification category with the highest salary level. Technically
there is also an A qualification category; however, this does not require a university degree and therefore does
not apply to any current recently hired teachers.
60
CHAPTER 4. HOW MUCH DO TEACHERS EARN OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM?
EVIDENCE FROM ONTARIO, CANADA
peace (1993) found that increases in relative earnings increased the labour-market partic-
ipation of female teachers in the United Kingdom. Further, Murnane and Olsen (1989a,
1989b, 1990), Murnane, Singer, and Willett (1989) and T. R. Stinebrickner (1998) found
that teachers who received a relatively large salary remained in the teaching profession for
more years. Ortega (2010) found that, in Venezuela, relative earnings between the teaching
profession and various non-teaching professions make little difference in terms of attract-
ing people to teaching. Moreover, Gilpin (2011) found that the work environment had a
greater effect on attrition than relative-income differences between the teaching profession
and other professions and that relative earnings only mattered for teachers with fewer than
six years of teaching experience. Similarly, Feng (2009) showed that teacher attrition is
more sensitive to working conditions than to income differentials with other occupations.
She reports that a 12 percent salary increase, which would make the average teacher salary
equal to those available through the outside option, would only increase teacher retention
by a mere 0.48 percentage points. For a comprehensive review of the literature on the rela-
tionship between teacher supply and income level, refer to the handbook chapter in Dolton
(2006).
In this study, I examine the opportunity cost of teachers’ college graduates and com-
pare it with teaching salaries. The results indicate that the outside-option salaries varied
substantially across cohorts, genders and periods since graduation; the median outside-
option salary was highest at $45,357 for the 2007 male cohort at the two-year milestone
since graduation, while the lowest was $23,822 for the 2013 female cohort at the six-month
milestone since graduation. In contrast, teaching salaries did not vary to any great extent
across any of the factors; the median teaching salary was highest at $49,706 for the 2011
male cohort at the two-year milestone since graduation and lowest at $46,800 for the 2007
female cohort at the six-month milestone since graduation. Furthermore, when comparing
salaries among members of the same graduating cohort year, teachers at the median earned
more than those graduates who found an outside job, both for males and females and for
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salaries six months and two years after graduation. In this regard, the greatest difference
was found to be among the 2012 females six months after graduation when the median
teaching salary was 103 percent higher than the median outside-job salary, while the small-
est difference was found to be among the 2007 males two years after graduation when
the median teaching salary was only 5 percent higher than the median outside-job salary.
There were no statistically significant gender differences across teaching salaries within
the same cohort year and within the same time period since graduation. For the outside
option, there were gender differences in earnings at both the six-month and the two-year
milestones since graduation; more specifically, males earned between 20 and 30 percent
more than females at the six-month milestone and between 13 and 30 percent at the two-
year milestone. Further, the later cohorts (namely 2012 and 2013) earned more through the
outside option than the earlier cohorts (namely 2007 and 2008). It is imperative to note that
these results are descriptive and not causal because, for example, students may be selecting
into teachers’ college according to their ability; something this study cannot address due to
data limitations. Nevertheless, I believe that this study provides a useful step in furthering
the understanding of the opportunity costs of teaching and how they are related to teaching
salaries.
Section 2 shows the data and descriptive statistics, Section 3 introduces the analysis
methodology, Section 4 contains the results, and Section 5 presents the conclusion and
discussion.
4.2 Data
This study uses four distinct sources of data: 1) the Ontario University Graduate Survey
(OUGS); 2) the “teacher data”; 3) the “salary-grid data”; and 4) the Qualifications Evalua-
tion Council of Ontario (QECO) data. The OUGS data contain aggregated binned salaries
of Ontario teacher education program graduates. The “teacher data” are employed to esti-
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mate the probabilities of acquiring a teaching job in the Ontario public school system, as
well as the probabilities of being placed in the highest qualification category. The “salary-
grid data” are employed to determine the likelihood of particular teaching salaries falling
within specific bin intervals for particular years of experience and for particular qualifica-
tion levels. Furthermore, the QECO data help to determine several probabilities that were
difficult to obtain reliably from the other data sources (Qualifications Evaluation Council
of Ontario [QECO], 2016).7
Chapters 1 and 2 provide more details about the “teacher data” and the OUGS data
respectively. In Chapter 1, I use the “teacher data” to explore the amount of time required
to find a teaching job in Ontario. In Chapter 2, I use the OUGS data to examine the relative
effects of degree programs and schools on earnings.
4.2.1 Ontario University Graduate Survey (OUGS)
The Ontario University Graduate Survey (OUGS) is a restricted-access data source pro-
vided and administered by the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities
(MTCU, 2013). The portion of the data for this study pertains to Ontario teachers’ college
graduates from the 2007 to 2013 cohorts and include part- and full-time salary information
collected at six months and two years after graduation for both males and females. The
salaries within the data are aggregated into bins; these are equal-sized $10,000 intervals for
the first 10 bins (i.e., bin 1 is [$0,$10,000], bin 2 is [$10,001,$20,000] and so on), while the
last bin is an open-ended interval of ≥ $100,000. Refer to Chapter 2 for more details about
the OUGS data.
The analysis excludes all of the graduates who did not find any employment. This
study considers a graduate to be employed if he selected as applicable one of the follow-
ing survey statements: “Offered Employment,” “Employed in a Paid Job (PT/FT)” and
“Self-employed.” Table 4.1 lists the samples sizes by graduating-year cohort, gender and
7QECO is an organization that evaluates teacher credentials for salary-grid category placement.
63
CHAPTER 4. HOW MUCH DO TEACHERS EARN OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM?
EVIDENCE FROM ONTARIO, CANADA
the amount of time that has elapsed since graduation, while “Num” refers to the number
of individuals covered by the survey and “Empl” refers to the total number of employed
individuals. The sample sizes were larger for the later cohorts (2010 and beyond) for both
males and females. Further, there were significantly more females than males; the propor-
tion was around 75 to 80 percent female depending on the cohort, a finding that is consistent
with Statistics Canada data that shows that the female proportion of all teacher-education
graduates in Ontario ranged between 76 and 78 percent over the same period (Statistics
Canada [StatCan], 2019).
The implicit assumption is that the graduates who did not seek or find any type of em-
ployment would draw their salary from the same known salary distribution as the employed
individuals. Even if there is a violation of this assumption, given the fact that the percentage
of employed individuals in the data is relatively high (ranging between 78 and 92 percent
six months after graduation and between 88 and 96 percent two years after graduation), it
follows that, if there is any bias, it should not be substantial.8
8It is worth emphasizing that this is similar to but not precisely the employment rate because it includes
graduates who were not in the labour force since they were not looking for work due to schooling and other
reasons.
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Table 4.1: OUGS: Sample Size by Cohort, Gender and Period Since Graduation
Cohort (Graduating Year)
2007 2008† 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Female
Num 1755 1629 2030 2256 2083 2267 2476
6 Months
Empl 1564 1423 1626 1769 1717 1903 2085
% Empl 92% 85% 79% 80% 81% 81% 84%
2 Years
Empl 1630 1486 1781 2001 1907 2107 2306
% Empl 96% 91% 89% 88% 92% 91% 92%
Male
Num 429 428 592 647 685 706 710
6 Months
Empl 396 364 466 516 555 572 595
% Empl 89% 87% 80% 78% 82% 84% 84%
2 Years
Empl 411 388 527 569 630 642 653
% Empl 93% 91% 88% 89% 92% 93% 93%
% Female 80% 79% 77% 78% 75% 76% 78%
Notes: † For the 2008 graduating cohort males two years after graduation, the “Offered Employment”
observation was missing due to suppression (privacy). I assumed a value of 5 (data are suppressed
when the values are between 1 and 5). The basis for this assumption is the relative proportion of the
“Offered Employment” value to the “Num” value of the non-missing observations.
4.2.2 Teacher Data
The “teacher data” was created by web scraping and by gathering and organizing teacher
administrative profiles from the public register of Ontario teachers available on the Ontario
College of Teachers website. The portion of the data that I used contains 56,004 gradu-
ates of Ontario teachers’ colleges for the graduating-year cohorts 2007 to 2013. Table 4.2
reports the sample sizes by graduating year. The sample sizes are similar across the years
2007 to 2011, followed by a decrease in 2012 and 2013.9 The Ontario College of Teachers
regulates all public-school teachers in Ontario, and thus the vast majority of Ontario teach-
ers’ college graduates are represented in the data. Refer to Chapter 1 for more details about
9The number of graduates in 2013 was lower relative to 2012 and 2011, for the same reasons as in Chapter
1, due to the exclusion of teachers from this analysis who acquired their licence after 2013. Moreover, the
lower number of graduates in 2012 and 2013 is also indicative of the lower enrolments in Ontario teachers’
colleges for those years . Refer to Section C.2.2 for more details.
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the “teacher data,” including the relevant background information related to the teacher
qualification regulations and the teacher labour markets.
Table 4.2: “Teacher Data” Sample Size by Graduating-Year Cohort
Year Sample N
2007 8344
2008 8518
2009 8399
2010 8441
2011 8180
2012 7740
2013 6382
Total 56004
4.2.3 Salary Grid Data
I created the “salary-grid data” specifically for this study by collecting and combining On-
tario public school-salary grids from 392 separate collective agreements. These collective
agreements cover the vast majority of the school boards outlined in the 2013 “Ontario
public schools enrolment” data found on the official Government of Ontario website (Gov-
ernment of Ontario, 2013). All major categories of school board are represented at both the
elementary- and secondary-school levels, including public, Roman Catholic and French-
language school boards. Refer to Section C.2.4 of the appendix for the assumptions used to
fill in any salary grids that were not directly drawn from the collective agreements. To the
best of my knowledge, up until the present, there are no other Ontario datasets that contain
a comprehensive collection of public-school teacher salaries across multiple qualification
levels.
Each salary grid has at least four columns and usually 13 rows. The columns represent
the qualification levels ranging from A1 to A4. A1 is the lowest qualification level and A4 is
the highest qualification level.10 The rows of the salary grid represent years of experience,
10Some salary grids include an extra column as the first column representing the lowest qualification level
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while moving down the grid represents an increase in earnings based on additional years of
experience; typically, a permanent teacher reaches the top experience level after 11 years
of employment. Table 4.3 summarizes the salary grids for the initial experience level.
The difference between the maximum and the minimum salary for any given year and
qualification level can be as low as $14,445 and as high as $19,229. The range in salaries
across the same qualification and experience levels is large enough that graduates from
the same graduating cohort sometimes fall within one of two or three different salary bins.
For example, a 2007 graduate at the initial experience level with the qualification level
A1 can earn a salary that might fall within the interval representing bins four through six,
depending on the location and the local union where he found a job. However, it is worth
noting that the standard deviations are relatively low, which means that the results are
more affected by the year and qualification levels in which the average salaries are near the
interval cut-off points. For example, the year 2007 salary grid at the initial experience level
and at the qualification level A3 has an average salary of $45,083 with a standard deviation
of $1,264, which is not close to a salary-bin cut-off; looking at the “salary-grid data,” 99.9
percent of all of the teachers to whom these salary grids would apply would earn a salary
that falls within the same $40,000 to $50,000 bin.11 However, the 2007 salary grids at the
initial experience level and at the qualification level A1 have an average salary of $39,607
with a standard deviation of $1,216, which is close to the interval cut-off; this means that,
for the teachers to whom these salary grids apply, around 41.2 percent of the salaries in the
data fall within the $40,000 to $50,000 bin, and around 58.8 percent of the salaries in the
data fall within the $30,000 to $40,000 bin.
A. However, this column does not apply to any new current newly hired teacher because it does not require a
university degree. All current newly hired teachers start at least at level A1.
11This conclusion is premised on the assumption that the number of teachers to whom these salary grids
apply is proportional to the student enrolment numbers within the respective jurisdictions of the collective
agreements considered in the current study.
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Table 4.3: Summary of Teacher Salary Grids at Step 0 Experience Level
Year Qualification Average
Salary
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum Difference
(Max-Min)
2007 A1 39607 1216 35291 50415 15124
A2 41534 1192 38428 54527 16099
A3 45083 1264 42056 56501 14445
A4 47608 1365 44269 58791 14522
2008 A1 41097 1237 36502 52655 16153
A2 43104 1207 39737 56949 17212
A3 46780 1289 43499 59011 15512
A4 49397 1396 46219 61402 15183
2009 A1 42149 1286 37232 54234 17002
A2 44206 1263 40532 58657 18125
A3 47977 1373 44369 60781 16412
A4 50661 1476 47143 63244 16101
2010 A1 43414 1325 38349 55861 17512
A2 45533 1301 41748 60417 18669
A3 49416 1415 45700 62605 16905
A4 52180 1518 48557 65142 16585
2011–2013 A1 44716 1365 39500 57537 18037
A2 46899 1340 43000 62229 19229
A3 50898 1457 47071 64483 17412
A4 53746 1564 50014 67096 17082
2014 A1 45105 1376 40260 57537 17277
A2 47306 1337 43848 62229 18381
A3 51339 1403 47998 64483 16485
A4 54212 1533 50522 67096 16574
Notes: The average and the standard deviation are weighted by the relative student enrolment across
the 147 school boards. The salary grids for 2011 to 2013 are the same because of a teacher salary freeze.
These salaries are not adjusted for inflation.
4.2.4 Qualifications Evaluation Council of Ontario (QECO) Documents
I use two QECO documents to estimate the respective probabilities of Ontario teachers’
college graduates falling within the teaching salary-grid qualification levels A1 to A4. The
first document, entitled “Teachers’ Qualifications Evaluation: Program 5,” outlines the reg-
ulations that translate specific teaching qualifications and specific levels of education and
experience into placements on the salary grids. The second document is a QECO presenta-
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tion material that states that 73 percent of new Ontario teachers’ college graduates qualify
at the A3 level and that more than 95 percent of new teachers qualify at the A2 level or
above (QECO, 2016).
I use the “teacher data,” which contain the education and qualification information for
Ontario teachers’ college graduates, in combination with the “Program 5” document, to
evaluate the likelihood that an individual graduate has the highest qualification level A4. I
then use the information from the presentation document, subject to certain assumptions,
to determine the probabilities for the other three qualification categories. Refer to Sec-
tion 4.3.1 and Table 4.4 for the details about the various assumptions and their use in the
estimation.
4.3 Methodology and Analysis
4.3.1 Outside-Option Salaries
The main goal of this study is to estimate the salaries of Ontario teachers’ college graduates
employed outside the Ontario public school system.12 In the first step, I use the “teacher
data” and the “salary-grid data” along with the QECO documents to determine the number
of individuals at each salary level who acquired a teaching job in the Ontario public school
system. In the second step, I use the values calculated in the first step in combination with
the OUGS data to determine the number of individuals who found a job outside the public
school system along with their respective salaries. The result of this procedure is a new
set of salary bins containing only the outside-job salaries; these are then used to fit the
log-normal distributions (similar to Chapter 2).
12The outside option or outside job and non-teaching job possibilities, in addition to referring to non-
teaching positions, include non-permanent teaching jobs in the Ontario public school system and teaching
jobs in the private sector. In other words, these definitions apply to anything other than a permanent Ontario
public-school teaching position.
69
CHAPTER 4. HOW MUCH DO TEACHERS EARN OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM?
EVIDENCE FROM ONTARIO, CANADA
The Outside-Option Salary Estimation for the Six-Month and Two-Year Milestones
Since Graduation
In equation 4.1, NOi,yr, f em,k defines the number of individuals of gender f em who graduated
from an Ontario teachers’ college in year yr with an outside job that pays a salary contained
within the interval of bin i.
NOi,yr, f em,k =

Ni,yr, f em−NTi,yr, f em,S alk=yr+1,q=1 −N
T
i,yr, f em,S alk=yr+1,q=0
= Ni,yr, f em if k = yr + 1
−Nyr, f em
[∑1
q=0 p(li ≤ X < ui,Tk−q, f em,S alk=yr+1,q)
]
(using two-year data)
Ni,yr, f em−NTi,yr, f em,S alk=yr,q=0
= Ni,yr, f em if k = yr
−Nyr, f em
[
p(li ≤ X < ui,Tk=yr, f em,S alk=yr,q=0)
]
(using six-month data)
(4.1)
Ni,yr, f em and NTi,yr, f em represent the number of individuals with a salary that falls within
the interval of bin i, respectively for the entire set (both teaching jobs and outside jobs)
and for teaching jobs only. Moreover, Nyr, f em refers to the OUGS survey respondents
for graduating year yr. The p(li ≤ X < ui,Tỹr, f em,S alk,q) in equation 4.1 refers to the
probability of receiving a teaching salary that falls within the interval [li,ui) of bin i; li and
ui define the corresponding lower- and upper-bound cut-off points of interval i. Tỹr refers
to the graduate finding a teaching job in year ỹr. S alk,q refers to the salary grid used in the
estimation, where k represents the salary-grid year and q refers to the level of experience
(q = 0 for step 0 and q = 1 for step 1 which represents an extra year of experience). The
estimations for the six-month data are developed in one step because all of the individuals
who are hired start at the same experience level on the salary grid; this is shown in the
second line of equation 4.1. However, the estimations for the two-year data have to be
developed in two parts because it is necessary to separately identify not only the individuals
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who found a job in the second year but also those individuals who found a job in the first
year. Further, the individuals who found a job in the first year will now be on the next step
of the salary grid.13 Therefore, for the two-year data, there are two groups of individuals
who have to be considered separately in the OUGS data: the individuals who acquired a
job in the first year, and the individuals who acquired a job in the second year; refer to the
first line in equation 4.1.
The joint probability used in equation 4.1 can be expanded into conditional probabilities
to illustrate the components of the data that are used in the estimation:
p(li ≤ X < ui,Tỹr, f em,S alk,q) =
A4∑
s=A1
p(li ≤ X < ui, s,Tỹr, f em,S alk,q) (4.2)
=
A4∑
s=A1
p(li ≤ X < ui|s,Tỹr,S alk,q)p(s,Tỹr, f em) (4.3)
=
A4∑
s=A1
p(li ≤ X < ui|s,Tỹr,S alk,q)p(s|Tỹr, f em)p(Tỹr, f em) (4.4)
Tỹr indicates that the individual acquired a teaching job in year ỹr, which is Tỹr = Tk−q
in the estimation using the two-year data and Tỹr = Tk in the estimation using the six-
month data. It is essential to highlight that the estimation at two years is using salary
grids from the following year after graduation. The p(li ≤ X < ui|s,Tỹr,S alk,q) in equation
4.2 represents the probability of having a salary in bin i conditional on qualification level
s ∈ {A1,A2,A3,A4} for an individual who secured a job in year ỹr, and the estimation is
using the salary grids for year k at experience level q (note that the salary grids do not vary
with gender). The p(s,Tỹr, f em) denotes the joint probability of acquiring a teaching job
in year ỹr for a gender denoted by f em and for qualification level s; these probabilities are
estimated using the “teacher data.”
13For example, in the six-month calculation, the individuals who graduated and acquired a job in 2007
would be on the 2007 salary grid at the step 0 experience level. However, for the two-year calculation, the
individuals who graduated in 2007 and acquired a job within six months would be on the 2008 salary grid at
the step 1 experience level, and those who acquired a job in year two would be on the 2008 salary grid at the
step 0 experience level.
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The Probability Estimations from the “Teacher Data”
The probabilities, p(Tk−q, f em) and p(A4|Tk−q, f em) ∀k,q from equation 4.2 could not be
directly extracted from the “teacher data” because the gender variable was not directly
observed and therefore these probabilities were estimated using logistic regressions (refer
to Chapter 1 for more details).
p(Tk−q, f em) =
exp(β0,k−q +β f em,1,k−q f em)
1 + exp(β0,k−q +β f em,1,k−q f em)
(4.5)
p(A4|Tk−q, f em) =
exp(β1,k−q +β f em,2 f em)
1 + exp(β1,k−q +β f em,2,k−q f em)
(4.6)
where f em is an indicator variable denoting gender (=1 for female), β0, β1 are the
constants in each of the respective equations, β f em,1 is the coefficient on the female variable
in the probability of acquiring a teaching job in year k−q, and β f em,2 is the coefficient on
the female variable in the probability of being in the highest qualification level category.
Although the data does not contain the gender variable directly, each observation n
contains the probability of being female, which is denoted by p f ,n. The contribution of
individual n to the likelihood is found by integrating the gender-specific likelihood func-
tion, which can be written as
[
p(m, f em)
]yn,ŷr [p(m, f em)]1−yn,ŷr , over f em = {1,0} (=1 for
female). The log-likelihood for the full sample is given by equation 4.7:
ln L(β; f em) =
∑
n
ln

p f ,n
[
p(m, f em = 1)
]yn,k−q [1− p(m, f em = 1)]1−yn,k−q︸                                                              ︷︷                                                              ︸
f emale
+
(1− p f ,n)
[
p(m, f em = 0)
]yn,k−q [1− p(m, f em = 0)]1−yn,k−q︸                                                                     ︷︷                                                                     ︸
male
 . (4.7)
Equation 4.7 is estimated for ∀m ∈ {(Tk−q), (A4|Tk−q)} ∀k,q. Moreover, yn,k−q is an
indicator variable denoting whether individual n acquired a job in year k− q for equation
4.5 and it denotes whether this individual was in the highest qualification category for
equation 4.6. Further, p(m, f em) does not vary with n and, therefore, there is a separate
estimation for each combination of k and q for both the six-month and the two-year data.
It is important to note that the probabilities for the other qualification categories like, for
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example, p(A3|Tk−q, f em), were partially derived from the QECO documents as described
in Section 4.2.4, and that they were evaluated under four different assumptions (see sum-
mary in Table 4.4). Assumption 2 means that all of the teachers’ college graduates have at
least a four-year bachelor’s degree (as opposed to a three-year degree). This is a reasonable
assumption given the fact that 94 percent of Ontario university students complete at least
a four-year degree, with the vast majority of graduates of an Ontario teachers’ college also
having earned their prerequisite degree in Ontario (Rushowy, 2012). Moreover, assumption
3 means that in addition to the four-year degree, the teachers’ college graduates have also
achieved a GPA that is consistent with a second-class standing or a minimum B average
as defined by the QECO (QECO, 2013). Thus, assumption 3 is also reasonable given the
fact that many Ontario concurrent teacher-education programs list a B to B- average as a
minimum admission requirement.14 Assumptions 1 and 4 represent the extreme opposite
values of the probabilities for the A4 qualification level; for assumption 1, the value in
the estimations is p̂1(A4|·) = 0.22 and, for assumption 2, it is p̂4(A4|·) = 0. These extreme
values of the probabilities of being in the highest qualification level A4 will translate into
the extreme values of the salaries within the framework of these assumptions because the
average salary is increasing in p̂ j(A4|·)∀ j.
14Typically, a B to B- average must be achieved for the last two full-time years of the preliminary degree.
Currently, as of June 2019, a B to B- is around a 70 percent GPA in most Ontario universities (Carleton
University, n.d.; OUAC, 2019a, 2019b).
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Table 4.4: Assumptions Summary for the Qualification Categories
Qualification Level
Assumption j
1 2/3 4
A1 0.05 p̂ j(A1|·) =
1−
∑A4
A=A1 p̂ j(A|·) if p̂ j(A4|·) > 0.95
0.05 otherwise
0.05
A2 0 p̂ j(A2|·) =
0.22− p̂ j(A4|·) if 0 ≤ p̂ j(A4|·) < 0.220 otherwise 0.22
A3 0.73 p̂ j(A3|·) =

0.73−
[
p̂ j(A4|·)−0.22
]
if 0.22 < p̂ j(A4|·) ≤ 0.95
0.73 if 0 ≤ p̂ j(A4|·) ≤ 0.22
0 if p̂ j(A4|·) > 0.95
0.73
A4 0.22 p̂ j(A4|·), 0 ≤ p̂ j(A4|·) ≤ 1 0
Distribution Estimations from the Binned Salary Data
Equation 4.1 results in a set {NOi,yr, f em,k|i ∈N,1 ≤ i ≤ 11} representing the estimated number
of individuals with an outside-option job at a salary corresponding to each bin i; a separate
set is estimated for each yr, f em,k combination. These salary bins are fitted to the log-
normal distribution using the maximum likelihood method.
The likelihood function is
L(θ|data) =
Z∑
a=1
1
Z
[ B∏
i=1
p(li ≤ X ≤ ui|θ)ni
( C∑
j=1
M∏
k=1
p(lk ≤ X ≤ uk |θ)ma, j,k
)]
(4.8)
=
Z∑
a=1
1
Z
[ B∏
i=1
[
F(ui|θ)−F(li|θ)
]ni( C∑
j=1
M∏
k=1
[
F(uk |θ)−F(lk |θ)
]ma, j,k)] (4.9)
lnL(θ|data) = ln
( 1
Z
)
+
( B∑
i=1
ni ln
[
F(ui|θ)−F(li|θ)
])
+ ln
( Z∑
a=1
C∑
j=1
γa, j
M∏
k=1
[
F(uk,yr |θ)−F(lk,yr |θ)
]ma, j,k)
︸                                                     ︷︷                                                     ︸
f or suppressed data
(4.10)
where Z is the number of possible bin totals stemming from the data missing as a result
of privacy suppression. Furthermore, B represents the number of non-missing bins and
ni represents the number of observations in the non-missing bin i. F(ui|θ) and F(li|θ) are
the cdfs for the log-normal distributions at the upper and lower boundaries respectively
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of the salary bin i interval, conditional on the parameters θ = {µ,σ}; F(uk|θ) and F(lk|θ)
are the analogous cdfs, but for the missing bin k interval. Ca is the number of possible
permutations for the unobserved observations in the missing bins, which are conditional
on a, since the permutations vary based on the total number of observations (observed plus
unobserved). M is the total number of missing bins and γ j,a is the weight factor for each
permutation j,a.15 The unobserved values are denoted by ma, j,k, which represents the total
possible number of unobserved individuals for part a, bin k, in permutation j.
4.3.2 Teaching Salaries
Another objective of this study is to compare the outside-option salaries with the public-
school teaching salaries. The latter were estimated by means of simulation using the prob-
abilities from the “salary grid data” and the “teacher data.” The following algorithm was
used for the salary point estimates and for the 95 percent confidence intervals for each com-
bination of gender f em, graduating year yr and each k milestone period since graduation
(where k = yr + 1 for the two-year data and k = yr for the six-month data):
1. Using the salary grids, I created four new teacher-salary datasets, one for each qualifi-
cation level s ∈ {A1,A2,A3,A4}; the salaries were drawn proportionally to the student
enrolment numbers for each school district.
2. With a similar approach to the first step in Section 4.3.1, I estimated the number
of individuals who acquired a teaching job in the Ontario public school system for
each qualification category level s. The difference with Section 4.3.1 is that, instead
of estimating the number of graduates in each salary bin, here I estimate the num-
ber of graduates for each qualification level. Furthermore, the estimations using the
two-year data require a two-step process analogous to that employed in Section 4.3.1:
15The weight factor γ:
γ =
M∏
i=1
si!
ri!(si− ri)!
where si =
∑M
j=i r j, ri is the number of observations in bin i and M is the number of missing bins.
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NT̃s,yr, f em,k =

Nyr, f em
[∑1
q=0 p(s,Tk−q, f em)
]
= Nyr, f em
[∑1
q=0 p(s|Tk−q, f em, salk,q)p(Tk−q, f em)
]
if k = yr + 1
(using two-year data)
Nyr, f em p(s,Tk, f em)
= Nyr, f em p(s|Tk, f em)p(Tk, f em) if k = yr
(using six-month data)
(4.11)
3. For each qualification category s I sampled NT̃s,yr, f em values from the corresponding
dataset created above in step 1 (with replacement). I repeated this step for 1,000
samples and calculated the median for each sample.
4. In calculating the confidence intervals, it has to be taken into account that the prob-
abilities determined in step 2 were estimated with an element of error. For each
estimated probability, I drew 1,000 samples for each coefficient from a joint normal
distribution given the mean and the variance-covariance matrix (refer to Section 4.3.1
for the regression equations 4.5 and 4.6).
5. For each of the 1,000 samples in step 4, I repeated steps 1 to 3. This resulted in a
larger combined sample of median teaching salaries; I calculated the median and the
95 percent confidence intervals from this sample.
4.4 Results
The analysis was done under four separate assumption scenarios that were related to the
probabilities of the graduates being within the various salary-grid qualification levels. There
was not enough information in the data to precisely pin down the qualification levels of the
graduates and thus these assumption scenarios reflect the various possibilities; refer to Ta-
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ble 4.4 in Section 4.3.1 for the explanation and summary of the assumptions. The results
for assumption 2, which reflect results that are roughly in the middle, are provided in Ta-
ble 4.5 and are illustrated in figure 4.1. However, the resulting estimates are very similar
under all of the assumptions; refer to Appendix Section C.3 for the results under the three
remaining assumptions.
The results are organized across four main categories based on gender (male and fe-
male) and milestone period since graduation (six months and two years). Furthermore,
within each of these categories there are 28 different specifications based on the outside-
option salaries and the teaching salaries for each of the seven graduating-year cohorts.
Much like in Chapter 2, a separate analysis is performed for each gender because there are
substantial gender differences in salaries that may be partially attributable to the gender
differences in part-time rates. For example, a weighted average of median salaries across
undergraduate programs at the two-year graduation milestone is $34,508 for females and
$43,650 for males, a result that is around 26 percent greater for males. Furthermore, fe-
males are more likely to work in a part-time job; for example, the part-time rate for females
in the undergraduate group is 24 percent, while for males it is only 14 percent of the same.16
The analysis for the overall salaries with the combined genders is not necessary, mainly be-
cause 75 to 80 percent of the teachers were female and because the overall salaries would
be very similar to the female salaries.
The results show that the teaching salaries were substantially greater than the outside-
option salaries for each cohort, gender and milestone period since graduation. The greatest
difference was for the 2012 female cohort where the median teaching salary at the six-
month milestone since graduation was 103 percent higher than the median outside-option
salary. The smallest difference was for the 2007 male cohort where the median teaching
salary at the two-year milestone since graduation was just around 5 percent higher than the
median outside-option salary. The median teaching salaries were virtually the same for the
16Refer to Chapter 2 Appendix Sections 6.4 and 6.7 for more details about the salaries and part-time rates
across programs and genders.
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the six-month and the two-year milestones since graduation for all male and female cohorts;
there are no statistically significant results that are consistent across all of the assumptions.
Moreover, the teaching salaries did not vary to any great extent between the cohort years.
For example, the highest median teaching salary, $49,706 for the 2011 males at the two-
year milestone, was only around 6 percent higher than the lowest median teaching salary,
$46,800 for the 2007 females at the six-month milestone. In terms of teaching salaries,
there are no statistically significant gender differences across all of the cohort years and
across both the six-month and the two-year milestones after graduation.
The outside-option salaries varied substantially across genders: males earned more in
every cohort and over both milestone periods after graduation – a difference between 20
to 30 percent at the six-month milestone after graduation and a difference of 13 to 30
percent at the two-year milestone for the same, depending on the cohort. Furthermore,
there was a significant difference in the outside-option salaries across cohorts, whereby
the more recent cohorts tended to have lower outside-option salaries. For example, in all
of the sub-tables A to D in Table 4.5, the 2007 and 2008 cohorts earned more than the
2012 and 2013 cohorts (with statistical significance). For males at the two-year milestone
after graduation, the 2007 cohort had the highest outside-option median salary at $45,357,
while the 2013 cohort had the lowest of the same at $33,909. For males at the six-month
milestone after graduation, the 2007 cohort had the highest outside-option median salary at
$37,698, while the 2013 cohort had the lowest of the same at $28,473. For females at the
two-year milestone after graduation, the 2007 cohort had the highest outside-option median
salary at $34,790, while the 2013 cohort had the lowest of the same at $27,450. For females
at the six-month milestone after graduation, the 2007 cohort had the highest outside-option
median salary at $29,557, while the 2013 cohort had the lowest of the same at $23,822.
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Table 4.5: Estimated Median Salaries
A Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) B Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Six Months After Graduation: Female Six Months After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 29557 46800 37698 46908
(28628–30515) (46677–47131) (35616–39903) (46450–47221)
2008 26647 47007 34650 47103
(25759–27565) (46648–47166) (32699–36718) (46538–47352)
2009 25482 48452 31660 48663
(24676–26314) (48290–48660) (29977–33438) (48422–49409)
2010 26554 49083 32177 49261
(25754–27379) (48906–49261) (30545–33896) (48731–49924)
2011 25053 49010 30637 49133
(24291–25840) (48804–49221) (28997–32369) (48578–49721)
2012 23894 48614 29359 48614
(23200–24609) (48320–48889) (27902–30892) (47908–49269)
2013 23822 47896 28473 47865
(23169–24493) (47583–48145) (27108–29906) (46867–48732)
C Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) D Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Two Years After Graduation: Female Two Years After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 34790 47532 45357 47573
(33650–35968) (47109–47756) (42750–48123) (47060–48262)
2008 32289 48025 38768 48453
(31233–33381) (47839–48453) (36352–41345) (47864–49224)
2009 29681 47852 35200 48149
(28729–30665) (47326–48036) (33300–37209) (47336–49108)
2010 29418 48681 34977 48238
(28560–30302) (48145–48951) (33217–36831) (47634–49083)
2011 30293 49421 34119 49706
(29440–31170) (49048–49751) (32310–36030) (48808–50600)
2012 29394 48696 34373 48696
(28629–30179) (48061–49243) (32818–36002) (47496–50149)
2013 27450 47430 33909 47338
(26745–28173) (46812–47975) (32460–35424) (46354–48734)
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Figure 4.1: The Teaching and Outside-Option Salaries by Gender
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4.5 Conclusion
In this study, I take advantage of a rare teacher-surplus environment in Ontario to esti-
mate the outside earnings options of Ontario teachers’ college graduates. Teacher-shortage
environments are generally more typical, and economists who study teachers’ personal
labour-supply decisions mostly try to understand why teachers enter, stay in and exit the
teaching profession from an attrition perspective. Typically, the modelling of these deci-
sions requires the relevant economic agents to consider the various outside options. Given
the common occurrence of teacher shortages in many jurisdictions, there are few opportu-
nities to observe teachers in non-teaching professional roles, and this makes it challenging
to find suitable data. The results of this study may help in understanding not only the earn-
ings of teachers relative to their outside-option counterparts, but also the potential sorting
of students into teacher-education programs corresponding to the labour market conditions
(i.e. in terms of the probability of finding a teaching job) at the time of their enrolment.
The main results in this study indicate that, in Ontario, the outside-option earnings
available to licensed teachers are substantially lower than the salaries paid to their public-
school counterparts; this outcome persists for both males and females, even after two years
of employment. Interestingly, this outcome also holds for the 2011 to 2013 cohorts, the
education-program graduating years that have been most affected by those years’ salary-
grid freezes. Further, there appears to be an ongoing downward trend: the outside-option
salaries are lower for the later cohorts (2012 and 2013) than for the earlier ones (2007
and 2008). This pattern suggests that, as it becomes more difficult to find a public-school
teaching position, the downward pressure on the median salaries is becoming increasingly
attributable to selection; teachers’ colleges may be accepting students with lower potential
outside-option earnings at a higher rate than in the past. Males were found to have greater
outside-option earnings across all cohorts, which may in part be due to their lower rates of
working on a part-time basis.
These results might be useful as inputs into a model examining teachers’ labour-supply
81
CHAPTER 4. HOW MUCH DO TEACHERS EARN OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM?
EVIDENCE FROM ONTARIO, CANADA
decisions. An example of a question that one might ask is as follows: Why are so many peo-
ple going to teachers’ college given the considerable difficulty of finding a teaching job?
Given the fact that many teachers’ college graduates come from an arts and humanities
background (including fine and applied arts), it is unsurprising that many of these individ-
uals decide to pursue teaching; this is especially the case because the median salaries for
the outside option available to teachers’ college graduates appear to be higher than for their
counterparts who graduate with an arts degree and who do not pursue a teaching degree
(refer to Chapter 2 for details about the arts and humanities salaries). The higher outside-
option salaries available to individuals who completed an education degree after graduating
from an arts program relative to those who hold only an arts degree suggest either that the
extra year of university studies is beneficial for earnings (even for those who are unable
to find a permanent teaching position) or that those with higher potential outside-option
earnings, despite their decision to pursue one extra year of university studies, tend to go to
teachers’ college.
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Conclusions
The three essays in this thesis contribute to the economics of education literature. Chap-
ters 2 and 4 examine topics related to teacher labour markets and Chapter 3 examines the
earnings of recent university graduates in the context of program and university choice.
In Chapter 2, I take advantage of the recent teacher surplus environment in Ontario,
which started around 2005, to examine which teacher characteristics schools value when
hiring new teachers’ college graduates. In other words, this environment allows me to
examine, to a greater extent than was possible before within the typical teacher shortage
context, the demand for teachers as opposed to the teacher labour supply. Traditionally,
teacher shortages are more common, and in that type of environment, schools have little
discretion in terms of whom they hire. People were cognizant of the fact that it was chal-
lenging to obtain a teaching job, but it was not entirely clear as to the extent the graduates
were experiencing difficulties.
One of the contributions from this chapter is that I create a dataset which allows me
to examine the teacher characteristics that affect the probability of acquiring a permanent
teaching position in the Ontario public school system. To do this, I use a duration model to
incorporate the time variables into the analysis.
The results show that it became increasingly difficult for each successive graduating-
year cohort to find a teaching position; the odds of finding a teaching job in 2006 were
around four times higher than they were in 2013. Furthermore, this study reports that
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teachers with French qualifications were around 3 to 5 times more likely to find a teaching
job than those of the reference group. It is essential to address this over-supply of teachers
because there are related policy-relevant issues. For example, in light of the poor math
performance of Ontario elementary students, it would seem desirable to have more teachers
with qualifications in math. Although teachers with math qualifications were still more
likely to acquire jobs than the reference group, they were not nearly as successful as those
with French qualifications. My findings could inform policy-makers to adapt hiring policies
that prioritize high priority fields, such as math in this case.
In Chapter 3, I examine whether the school or the program choice has a more signif-
icant impact on the earnings of university graduates. I use relative-importance analysis
to decompose the variation in earnings into program and school components. To perform
the analysis, I use restricted-access government-administered data, the Ontario University
Graduate Survey.
The results indicate that the earnings variation attributable to programs was substan-
tially higher than the amount of variation in earnings attributable to schools. For example,
from the overall specification across all degree types and genders in the data, at six months
since graduation the programs accounted for 21.8 percent of the variation while the schools
accounted for 2.1 percent of the variation. Putting this another way, the amount of earn-
ings variation accounted for by the programs was around 10 times to that of the schools.
This chapter emphasizes the fact that since the amount of earnings variation attributable
to schools is much smaller than to programs, students should feel comfortable choosing a
program without feeling disadvantaged if they are unable to attend the most elite institution.
In Chapter 4, I take advantage of the teacher surplus environment in Ontario to exam-
ine the outside-option earnings of recent Ontario teachers’ college graduates and compare
them to teaching salaries from the same cohort. Given the fact that teacher shortages are
common, there are few opportunities to examine teachers in non-teaching positions. One
of the contributions in this chapter is I that create a new teacher salary dataset by collect-
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ing, extracting and organizing salary grid information from teacher bargaining collective
agreements. To perform the analysis, I then use the new salary data in combination with
the data from the previous two chapters.
According to this study, the median outside-option salaries varied across cohorts, gen-
ders and periods since graduation. In contrast, the median teaching salaries did not vary
to any great extent. Moreover, there were no gender differences across teaching salaries;
however, for the outside-option salaries, males earned more than females in every gradu-
ating cohort and for both the six-month and two-year milestone periods since graduation.
These results might be useful to researchers since the opportunity cost of teaching is a
fundamental aspect of understanding the occupational mobility decisions of teachers.
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Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Data Details
A.1.1 Data Construction
In order to simplify the analysis, I constructed the subject group variables in such a way as
to avoid overlapping categories for graduates who acquired subject qualifications that span
across multiple subject areas (e.g. French and mathematics). I assumed that being quali-
fied in multiple subjects does not necessarily increase the chances of finding a job. Also,
I assumed that a subject qualification that provides a much higher probability of finding
a job, determined through a process of various regression specifications, drives the ma-
jority of the results attributed to that particular subject qualification. First, if teachers hold
French or technological qualifications, regardless of any other qualifications they may have,
the probability of finding a job is mostly dependent on these qualifications. Thus, teacher
graduates who hold French qualifications, whether they have any other qualifications, are
grouped into the "French" category. Second, teacher graduates who hold technological
qualifications and no French, regardless of any other qualifications, are grouped into the
"technology" category. Third, if the individuals have math and no reading/writing, French
or technological qualifications, then they are grouped into the "math" category. Next, the
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"reading/writing" category is similar to the "math" category, in that if the individuals have
reading/writing and no math, French or technological qualifications, then they are grouped
into the "reading/writing" category. Finally, if teachers’ college graduates have qualifica-
tions that do not fit into the categories mentioned above, these qualifications are classified
as "all others." Furthermore, teachers who are only certified to teach in the elementary grade
divisions may not have any subject specialty; a classification denoted as "no subject."
A.1.2 Gender of the Teacher
The teacher profiles, available from the public register of teachers, do not contain the gen-
der of the individuals; however, they do include the first and last names, which are useful
in determining the probability of each individual being male or female. The solution em-
ployed in this study is software-based (developed by NamSorTMApplied Onomastics); it is
a RapidMiner add-on extension called Onomastics Extension v.5.3.0 that uses the Gendre
API v.0.0.15. This software algorithm extracts information from the combination of first
and last names and assigns it a value between -1 and +1 related to how likely the individual
is a male or a female (Carsenat, 2014).
For many teacher profiles in the data, the full name variable contains more than two
names. Therefore, I assumed that the first and last words in the text field define the first
and last names, respectively, and are used as inputs of the algorithm. As mentioned above,
the output values are on a scale between -1 and +1 in increments of 0.1 (a negative/positive
value represents a higher chance of being male/female). However, the resulting output
values from the software cannot directly be used in the analysis because they are not prob-
abilities; the gender component of the likelihood function requires the probability of being
male/female. Thus, in the next step, I mapped these output scale values into probabilities.
In order to do this mapping, I used a separate independent dataset that contains a large
number of full names along with their gender and country of origin. The data I used is the
FIDE (Fédération Internationale des Échecs) international database of rated chess players
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(Fédération Internationale des Échecs [FIDE], 2014). For privacy reasons, it is generally
challenging to find a dataset containing both first and last names as well as the gender.
Although the FIDE data is not ideal because only 11.9 percent of the data is female, the
dataset is large enough that it still contains enough females to be suitable for this study;
overall, the dataset contains 461,934 individuals from 180 countries. Furthermore, I used
the NamSorTM software to process the FIDE dataset, which provides the mapping between
the output scale results and the actual genders of the individuals.
Before assigning the output scale numbers to the probabilities, I adjusted the ethnic dis-
tribution of the FIDE data to mimic the Canadian teacher demographics, because the output
values from the software do not map into the same probability distribution across differ-
ent ethnic groups. For example, the estimates of gender using this algorithm with Chinese
names are not as reliable as from French or English names. Moreover, the FIDE dataset
has a substantially different distribution of ethnicities than that of Canadian teachers. The
weights for the ethnic distribution of Canadian teachers, which are used to adjust the FIDE
data, come from the 2006 Census of Population (StatCan, 2006, 2008).
For each scale number, there is a proportion of individuals in the FIDE data who are
female or male providing a mapping between the scale number and the gender. Table A.1
reports the probability of being female assigned to each scale value from the NamSorTM
software. For example, the table shows that the proportion of individuals whose names,
which were used as inputs, produced an output scale of -1 is 5.25 percent female, then it
follows that p( f emale|scale# = +1) = 0.0525; which is a mapping of the scale number to
the probability of being female. Furthermore, this table shows that around 75 percent of
output values are at the extremes, either +1 or -1, and it also shows that if the software
produces these output values respectively, the probabilities of being male or female are
high (around 95 percent or higher).
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Table A.1: Probability of Being Female (Adjusted FIDE Data)
Number of Individuals Probability
Proportion in the Data
Scale Female Male Total Female
-1 111.92 2020.55 2132.46 5.25% 21.33%
-0.9 11.97 38.91 50.88 23.53% 0.51%
-0.8 10.55 23.87 34.42 30.65% 0.34%
-0.7 20.28 123.48 143.76 14.11% 1.44%
-0.6 10.76 16.95 27.71 38.83% 0.28%
-0.5 54.41 102.42 156.83 34.69% 1.57%
-0.4 20.62 16.38 37.00 55.73% 0.37%
-0.3 23.34 9.43 32.77 71.22% 0.33%
-0.2 12.06 3.65 15.71 76.77% 0.16%
-0.1 221.51 87.39 308.91 71.71% 3.09%
0 119.85 16.88 136.73 87.65% 1.37%
0.1 237.75 15.62 253.37 93.84% 2.53%
0.2 13.61 5.52 19.13 71.14% 0.19%
0.3 20.62 2.83 23.45 87.93% 0.23%
0.4 58.78 4.16 62.94 93.39% 0.63%
0.5 571.08 10.78 581.86 98.15% 5.82%
0.6 34.04 1.47 35.51 95.86% 0.36%
0.7 464.92 5.00 469.92 98.94% 4.70%
0.8 27.00 2.83 29.83 90.51% 0.30%
0.9 63.77 3.98 67.74 94.14% 0.68%
1 5361.35 15.50 5376.85 99.71% 53.78%
Total 7470.16 2527.63 9997.79 9997.79 100%
A.1.3 Timing of the Variables
This section describes all the assumptions concerning the timing of the variables. The
data contain the year an individual acquired a teaching licence; however, the primary time
variable is the graduation year from teachers’ college. In other words, the graduation year
is the starting point, regardless of when the teaching certification was issued.
The periods in this study are discrete in one-year intervals. The first assumption is that
each individual graduated from their teacher education program in June of his or her grad-
uating year and immediately began looking for a job. Second, if an individual found a job,
then their starting date (and the date they found the job) was in September of the NTIP year.
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For example, if the NTIP date was 2015, then the graduate found their job in September
of 2014. Nonetheless, there are some notable exceptions to these assumptions due to pecu-
liarities in the data. To acquire a teaching licence, each teacher needs to complete a teacher
education program and a separate bachelor’s degree. However, there are instances in the
data, where the graduation year for the separate bachelor’s degree is in a later year than the
graduation year from teachers’ college. In such situations, I assumed that individuals began
searching for a job in June of the year they completed their other (non-teaching) bachelor’s
degree.
Another time variable is the date of completion for subject qualifications, which in-
cludes both month and year in the data; thus, I assumed that the qualifications completed
between October and December count for the following year. For example, a qualifica-
tion completed in September of 2006 counts for 2006, while a qualification completed
in October of 2006 counts for 2007. Furthermore, since Basic Qualifications (BQs) are
a requirement for teaching and because they are more often than not dated the year that
the teacher acquires a teaching licence, those initial BQs were backdated to the year the
graduate started the above-assumed search for a job.1
Table A.2 shows the number of graduates from each graduating cohort that certified
across the various years in the data. In general, the vast majority of graduates acquired their
licences in the same year that they graduated. The initial data was downloaded between
August 25, 2014 and September 2, 2014.2 Since 2014 was only a partial year in the data,
1A distinction can be made between three types of subject qualifications that a teacher can acquire: Basic
Qualifications (BQs), Additional Basic Qualifications (ABQs) and Additional Qualifications (AQs). BQs
certify a graduate to teach a specific grade division and subject speciality (if at the high school level, since
there are no specialties at the elementary grade level), and graduates usually receive these qualifications right
after their initial teacher education program. ABQs are similar to BQs in that they allow a teacher to expand
their expertise in a new grade division or subject speciality, except that they are usually acquired later on
after the initial teacher certification. Finally, AQs allow a teacher to expand their knowledge in new subjects
or subjects that they are already qualified in, but within a grade division they are already certified to teach
(the difference being that only BQs and ABQs can add certifications in new grade divisions) (OCT, 2019a,
2019c). In terms of categories for analysis, this paper makes no distinction between these different types of
qualifications.
2There were subsequent downloads up until 2018 to include updated NTIP dates, licence status and
subject qualification information (valid up to 2016); however, this information was only updated for the
graduates present in the initial download.
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I excluded all graduates who acquired their teaching certification in 2014 (6,097 in total).
Of those excluded graduates, 4,734 graduated in 2014; the remaining excluded individuals
are reported in the 2014 column of Table A.2.
Table A.2: The Relationship Between the Cohort Year and the Certification Year
Year
Certification Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 2014 Total* % (Year =
Year
Cert.)
2006 7314 250 78 30 17 11 10 6 7716 8 7724 94.7%
2007 35 7590 338 88 32 25 14 7 8129 10 8139 93.3%
2008 0 40 7684 334 103 43 16 9 8229 8 8237 93.3%
2009 0 1 17 7526 518 119 45 39 8265 18 8283 90.9%
2010 0 1 3 16 7400 695 122 63 8300 36 8336 88.8%
2011 0 0 0 5 35 7269 577 141 8027 70 8097 89.8%
2012 0 0 0 0 7 41 6357 1143 7548 248 7796 81.5%
2013 0 0 0 0 2 1 14 6178 6195 965 7160 86.3%
Notes: The “Year” refers to the year the graduate started searching for a job (primarily based on the
graduating-year cohort from teachers’ college). For the several later cohorts in the data, especially 2013,
the percentage of graduates who obtained a licence in in the same year as their cohort year is likely
overstated to a greater extent than for earlier cohorts because of right censoring being closer to the start
year (graduation year) of the later cohorts. Although the analysis in the paper excludes graduates who
were certified in 2014, the last column uses “Total*” as the denominator which includes the 2014
certification year to give a more realistic idea about the percentage of graduates that became certified in
the year they graduated. The “Total” column includes certification years 2006 to 2013.
A.1.4 Descriptive Statistics
Tables A.3 and A.4 report the subject qualifications and grade divisions, respectively, across
cohorts in their first year on the job market. Table A.3 is similar to Table 2.1 from Chapter 2,
except the latter includes information about all the periods (not just the first). Comparing
these two tables shows the number of individuals that added qualifications after the first
year on the job market. For example, for the 2006 cohort, the all-others group increased
from 4,037 in the first year to 5,041 across all years on the job market.
It is important to highlight that the substantial decrease in the number of graduates from
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2012 to 2013 is due to the 965 graduates who although graduated in 2013, did not acquire
a teaching certification until 2014 and were excluded from this study.3
Table A.3: Subject Qualifications and Grade Divisions by Graduating-Year Cohort: First Year
Year
Subject Qualifications
Total4
French Technology Math Reading/Writing5 No Subject All Others
2006 422 148 712 64 2333 4037 7716
5.5% 1.9% 9.2% 0.8% 30.2% 52.3%
2007 525 218 624 96 2473 4193 8129
6.5% 2.7% 7.7% 1.2% 30.4% 51.6%
2008 590 219 668 102 2278 4372 8229
7.2% 2.7% 8.1% 1.2% 27.7% 53.1%
2009 620 170 586 76 2306 4507 8265
7.5% 2.1% 7.1% 0.9% 27.9% 54.5%
2010 674 236 513 90 2406 4381 8300
8.1% 2.8% 6.2% 1.1% 29.0% 52.8%
2011 757 254 542 72 2218 4184 8027
9.4% 3.2% 6.8% 0.9% 27.6% 52.1%
2012 752 221 508 78 2071 3918 7548
10.0% 2.9% 6.7% 1.0% 27.4% 51.9%
2013 741 160 456 44 1509 3285 6195
12.0% 2.6% 7.4% 0.7% 24.4% 53.0%
Total 5081 1626 4609 622 17594 32877 62409
8.1% 2.6% 7.4% 1.0% 28.2% 52.7%
3To a lesser extent, the number of graduates in 2013 is also lower relative to the number of graduates in
2012 due to a 7.6 percent drop in confirmed enrolments from 2011 to 2012 (OUAC, 2012).
4Note that in Table A.3, the rows add up to 100 percent (i.e., the denominators are located in the last
column).
5The number of graduates with “reading/writing” qualifications increased substantially after the first year
because these qualifications are only available as Additional Qualifications as opposed to French or math that
are also available as Basic Qualifications. Recall, that all teachers must start with BQs, and do not ncecessarily
hold any AQs in the first year; refer to the previous sub-section for more details.
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Table A.4: Grade Divisions by Graduating-Year Cohort: First Year
Year
Grade Divisions
Total
Elementary High School Elementary/High School
2006 3202 2589 1925 7716
41.5% 33.6% 24.9%
2007 3438 2713 1978 8129
42.3% 33.4% 24.3%
2008 3346 2817 2066 8229
40.7% 34.2% 25.1%
2009 3378 2798 2089 8265
40.9% 33.9% 25.3%
2010 3465 2647 2188 8300
41.7% 31.9% 26.4%
2011 3275 2711 2041 8027
40.8% 33.8% 25.4%
2012 3097 2442 2009 7548
41.0% 32.4% 26.6%
2013 2458 1908 1829 6195
39.7% 30.8% 29.5%
Total 25659 20625 16125 62409
41.1% 33.0% 25.8%
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B.1 Data Details
Table B.1 shows a fictional example depicting the aggregate data format of the Ontario
University Graduate Survey. For instance, the first observation line means that for the 2007
graduating cohort from the University of Western Ontario in the humanities program, 20
female graduates had a salary between $50,001 and $60,000 (Bin 6).
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Table B.1: Example of the OUGS Data Format for Schools and Programs (Fictional Data)
Demographic Variables
Obs. Graduation
Year
School Program Gender Number of
Respondents
1 2007 University
of Western
Ontario
Humanities Female 150
2 2008 University
of Toronto
Social Science Male 122
(continued below)
Employment Outcome Variables: Six-Month Salary Bins (1–11) and Employment Status
Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
1 * 9 7 10 15 20 24 12 10 6 * 115 6 12 91 30
2 6 * 6 7 12 13 15 12 8 7 * 87 7 14 79 15
Notes: The numbers in this table are fictional.
Survey Response Choices: Q1 – Employed, Q2 – Offered employment to start at a later date,
Q3 – Not employed and not in school, Q4 – Full-time and Q5 – Part-time.
B.1.1 Data Cleaning
In the data cleaning process all of the observations where the “Number of Completed Sur-
veys” and the “Employed” variables were suppressed were eliminated. This was done sep-
arately for the six-month and two-year data variables. Also, the one and only observation
where the “Employed” variable had a value of 0 (from the six-month data) was dropped.
The original dataset had 3,066 different aggregate observations (simlar to each line of Table
B.1) representing a range between 142,064 and 144,488 individuals (MTCU, 2013). The
resulting sets had 2,179 observations with 139,075 individuals from the six-month data,
and 2,240 observations accounting for 139,657 individuals from the two-year data.
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B.1.2 Lognormal Distribution Assumption
Figure B.1: Lognormal Assumption Charts
Notes: Bar graphs (A)–(D) show the overall frequency of salaries at six months since grad-
uation. Graph (A) only includes observations that had no missing bins. Graph (B) is under
the assumption that all bins with missing values were replaced with “1”. Similarly, graph
(C) missing values were replaced with “3”, and graph (D) missing values were replaced
with “5”. The bins in the data are described in Section 3.3. The last bin in each graph tends
to be higher than the previous bin because it is an open-ended bin, over $100,000, which
has a range greater than the other bins (greater than $10,000).
B.1.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.2: Summary Statistics: Survey Respondents: School-Program Combinations by Gender
Gender Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Total N
Combined Genders 556 688 6 4850 139063
Female 395 492 6 3624 91227
Male 220 268 6 1555 47836
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics: Survey Respondents: School-Program Combinations by Gender
and Cohort
Gender Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Total N
Combined
Genders
2007 59 66 6 605 19858
2008 56 61 6 569 18719
2009 66 72 7 521 23383
2010 65 75 6 631 24911
2011 64 72 6 637 24409
2012 71 85 6 668 27783
Female
2007 73 79 6 605 13545
2008 66 72 6 569 12369
2009 82 86 7 521 15288
2010 83 90 6 631 16116
2011 79 85 6 637 15860
2012 90 102 6 668 18049
Male
2007 42 39 6 210 6313
2008 43 41 6 224 6350
2009 49 47 7 261 8095
2010 47 50 6 309 8795
2011 47 50 6 305 8549
2012 52 55 6 291 9734
Table B.4: Summary Statistics: Survey Respondents: Schools by Gender and Cohort
Combined Genders Female Male
Year Mean Std. Dev. Total N Mean Std. Dev. Total N Mean Std. Dev. Total N
2007 946 694 19858 645 466 13545 301 240 6313
2008 891 679 18719 589 440 12369 302 251 6350
2009 1113 805 23383 728 511 15288 385 308 8095
2010 1186 842 24911 767 533 16116 419 323 8795
2011 1162 794 24409 755 512 15860 407 300 8549
2012 1323 952 27783 859 610 18049 464 356 9734
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Table B.5: Summary Statistics: Survey Respondents: Programs by Gender and Cohort
Combined Genders Female Male
Year Mean Std. Dev. Total N Mean Std. Dev. Total N Mean Std. Dev. Total N
2007 764 1098 19858 521 810 13545 243 360 6313
2008 720 1021 18719 476 727 12369 244 368 6350
2009 899 1273 23383 588 907 15288 311 445 8095
2010 958 1329 24911 620 946 16116 338 478 8795
2011 939 1306 24409 610 911 15860 329 475 8549
2012 1069 1507 27783 694 1059 18049 374 530 9734
Table B.6: Female Survey Respondents by Undergraduate Programs and Cohort
Programs
Cohort (Graduating Year)
Total
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Pharmacy 43 55 65 64 107 109 443
Nursing 811 769 936 1010 1053 1122 5701
Engineering 322 260 290 364 343 478 2057
Computer Science 64 45 9 17 27 31 193
Therapy & Rehabilitation 32 22 37 0 0 0 91
Mathematics 119 65 99 127 137 99 646
Business & Commerce 1269 1113 1338 1472 1572 1695 8459
Forestry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Health Professions 387 366 506 484 546 572 2861
Other Arts & Science 441 395 496 567 598 718 3215
Architecture & Landscape Architecture 32 38 45 67 39 78 299
Physical Sciences 56 99 68 102 150 98 573
Journalism 45 48 80 74 71 83 401
Social Sciences 3608 3224 4063 4200 4076 4835 24006
Agriculture & Biological Science 1050 926 1287 1154 1004 1252 6673
Food Science & Nutrition 164 169 199 220 228 337 1317
Kinesiology / Recreation / Physical Edu. 670 542 602 646 615 624 3699
Humanities 1840 1685 1967 2040 1963 2243 11738
Fine & Applied Arts 529 548 651 709 698 817 3952
Total 11482 10369 12738 13317 13227 15191 76324
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Table B.7: Female Survey Respondents by Professional Programs and Cohort
Programs
Cohort (Graduating Year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Dentistry 0 13 19 21 27 24 104
Optometry 25 18 21 23 27 31 145
Veterinary Medicine 31 41 40 41 38 38 229
Medicine 76 90 143 102 117 125 653
Law 176 209 281 342 315 358 1681
Education 1755 1629 2030 2256 2083 2267 12020
Theology 0 0 16 14 26 15 71
Total 2063 2000 2550 2799 2633 2858 14903
Table B.8: Male Survey Respondents by Undergraduate Programs and Cohort
Programs
Cohort (Graduating Year)
Total
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Pharmacy 11 17 29 35 44 53 189
Nursing 8 45 68 93 85 99 398
Engineering 1147 1134 1364 1561 1456 1557 8219
Computer Science 287 302 326 316 281 308 1820
Therapy & Rehabilitation 8 0 0 0 0 0 8
Mathematics 107 110 143 204 125 207 896
Business & Commerce 1117 1185 1332 1501 1502 1667 8304
Forestry 0 9 0 0 12 0 21
Health Professions 83 77 170 179 129 200 838
Other Arts & Science 227 236 276 299 307 369 1714
Architecture & Landscape Architecture 28 14 54 46 43 46 231
Physical Sciences 25 71 83 143 128 154 604
Journalism 0 0 9 17 9 0 35
Social Sciences 1152 1196 1552 1551 1628 1882 8961
Agriculture & Biological Science 407 330 559 546 475 616 2933
Food Science & Nutrition 7 0 16 18 8 37 86
Kinesiology/Recreation/Physical Ed. 244 183 255 273 332 328 1615
Humanities 635 636 763 783 710 864 4391
Fine & Applied Arts 158 139 162 240 259 256 1214
Total 5651 5684 7161 7805 7533 8643 42477
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Table B.9: Male Survery Respondents by Professional Programs and Cohort
Programs
Cohort (Graduating Year)
Total
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dentistry 7 6 22 15 9 15 74
Optometry 0 9 12 9 7 8 45
Veterinary Medicine 7 0 0 11 6 7 31
Medicine 65 65 111 82 76 98 497
Law 154 161 201 220 212 252 1200
Education 429 425 588 645 683 699 3469
Theology 0 0 0 8 23 12 43
Total 662 666 934 990 1016 1091 5359
B.1.4 Inflation Adjusted Bins
Table B.10: Bin Adjustments for Inflation
Year 6 Months 2 Years
2007 1.044763 1.017437
2008 1.009516 1
2009 1.017437 0.970075
2010 1 0.958128
2011 0.970075 0.94801
2012 0.958128 0.928401
Notes: The year refers to the graduating cohort. Everything was adjusted to 2010 dollars (August CPI).
Source: Bank of Canada (BOC, 2019).
B.2 Analysis
This is a simplified example with two bins and four observations to illustrate the different
possible permutations for the privacy-suppressed data. Let obs1,obs2,obs3,obs4 be the in-
dividual observations. Table B.11 shows that there are six ways to arrange the observations
within two bins when two observations have to be within each bin. Moreover, Table B.12
illustrates that are six ways to arrange observations when one of the bins has to have one
observation and the other bin has to have three observations. Refer to the tables below:
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Table B.11: Permutations for Missing Data: Two Observations in Each Bin
Bins for (2,2)
Permutation
1 2 3 4 5 6
Bin 1 obs1,obs2 obs1,obs3 obs1,obs4 obs3,obs4 obs2,obs4 obs2,obs3
Bin 2 obs3,obs4 obs2,obs4 obs2,obs3 obs1,obs2 obs1,obs3 obs1,obs4
Table B.12: Permutations for Missing Data: Three Observations in One Bin and One Observation
in the Other
Permutation
1 2 3 4
Bins for (1,3)
Bin 1 obs1 obs2 obs3 obs4
Bin 2 obs2,obs3,obs4 obs1,obs3,obs4 obs1,obs2,obs4 obs1,obs2,obs3
Bins for (3,1)
Bin 1 obs2,obs3,obs4 obs1,obs3,obs4 obs1,obs2,obs4 obs1,obs2,obs3
Bin 2 obs1 obs2 obs3 obs4
B.2.1 Detailed Results with Different Orders of Regressors
Table B.13: Relative-Importance: Combined Programs and Combined Genders
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 499700
Average 0.218 0.021 0.029 0.268
(0.213–0.223) (0.020–0.023) (0.027–0.032) (0.263–0.273)
Prgs. First 0.229 0.011 0.029 0.268
(0.224–0.233) (0.009–0.012) (0.027–0.032) (0.263–0.273)
Schs. First 0.207 0.032 0.029 0.268
(0.202–0.212) (0.030–0.034) (0.027–0.032) (0.263–0.273)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 554510
Average 0.189 0.018 0.025 0.233
(0.184–0.195) (0.016–0.019) (0.023–0.028) (0.227–0.239)
Prgs. First 0.199 0.008 0.025 0.233
(0.193–0.204) (0.007–0.010) (0.023–0.028) (0.227–0.239)
Schs. First 0.180 0.027 0.025 0.233
(0.175–0.185) (0.025–0.029) (0.023–0.028) (0.227–0.239)
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Table B.14: Relative-Importance: Combined Programs and Female
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 327330
Average 0.208 0.021 0.032 0.262
(0.203–0.213) (0.019–0.023) (0.029–0.035) (0.256–0.268)
Prgs. First 0.217 0.012 0.032 0.262
(0.212–0.223) (0.011–0.014) (0.029–0.035) (0.256–0.268)
Schs. First 0.199 0.031 0.032 0.262
(0.194–0.204) (0.028–0.033) (0.029–0.035) (0.256–0.268)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 363965
Average 0.174 0.017 0.030 0.221
(0.168–0.181) (0.015–0.019) (0.027–0.035) (0.214–0.231)
Prgs. First 0.182 0.009 0.030 0.221
(0.176–0.189) (0.008–0.011) (0.027–0.035) (0.214–0.231)
Schs. First 0.167 0.024 0.030 0.221
(0.160–0.173) (0.022–0.027) (0.027–0.035) (0.214–0.231)
Table B.15: Relative-Importance: Combined Programs and Male
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 172370
Average 0.202 0.027 0.038 0.267
(0.193-0.212) (0.023-0.030) (0.033-0.045) (0.257-0.279)
Prgs. First 0.214 0.015 0.038 0.267
(0.204-0.224) (0.013-0.018) (0.033-0.045) (0.257-0.279)
Schs. First 0.191 0.038 0.038 0.267
(0.181-0.201) (0.034-0.043) (0.033-0.045) (0.257-0.279)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 190545
Average 0.182 0.021 0.034 0.237
(0.172-0.193) (0.018-0.024) (0.028-0.042) (0.226-0.250)
Prgs. First 0.192 0.011 0.034 0.237
(0.181-0.203) (0.009-0.014) (0.028-0.042) (0.226-0.250)
Schs. First 0.172 0.031 0.034 0.237
(0.162-0.184) (0.027-0.034) (0.028-0.042) (0.226-0.250)
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Table B.16: Relative-Importance: Professional Programs and Combined Genders
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 84975
Average 0.176 0.053 0.008 0.238
(0.165-0.188) (0.048-0.060) (0.005-0.013) (0.224-0.252)
Prgs. First 0.206 0.023 0.008 0.238
(0.194-0.220) (0.019-0.029) (0.005-0.013) (0.224-0.252)
Schs. First 0.146 0.084 0.008 0.238
(0.134-0.157) (0.074-0.092) (0.005-0.013) (0.224-0.252)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 91690
Average 0.194 0.054 0.009 0.257
(0.174-0.216) (0.048-0.060) (0.004-0.021) (0.236-0.282)
Prgs. First 0.223 0.024 0.009 0.257
(0.204-0.245) (0.020-0.030) (0.004-0.021) (0.236-0.282)
Schs. First 0.165 0.083 0.009 0.257
(0.144-0.187) (0.075-0.092) (0.004-0.021) (0.236-0.282)
Table B.17: Relative-Importance: Professional Programs and Female
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 62320
Average 0.152 0.053 0.007 0.213
(0.141-0.164) (0.047-0.060) (0.005-0.011) (0.200-0.226)
Prgs. First 0.180 0.025 0.007 0.213
(0.168-0.193) (0.020-0.031) (0.005-0.011) (0.200-0.226)
Schs. First 0.124 0.082 0.007 0.213
(0.112-0.135) (0.072-0.091) (0.005-0.011) (0.200-0.226)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 67320
Average 0.167 0.057 0.016 0.240
(0.146-0.191) (0.050-0.064) (0.006-0.043) (0.212-0.285)
Prgs. First 0.193 0.030 0.016 0.240
(0.172-0.216) (0.024-0.037) (0.006-0.043) (0.212-0.285)
Schs. First 0.140 0.083 0.016 0.240
(0.118-0.166) (0.073-0.093) (0.006-0.043) (0.212-0.285)
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Table B.18: Relative-Importance: Professional Programs and Male
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 22655
Average 0.206 0.059 0.015 0.279
(0.179-0.235) (0.047-0.072) (0.005-0.034) (0.245-0.315)
Prg. First 0.239 0.025 0.015 0.279
(0.212-0.271) (0.016-0.036) (0.005-0.034) (0.245-0.315)
Sch. First 0.172 0.092 0.015 0.279
(0.145-0.201) (0.076-0.110) (0.005-0.034) (0.245-0.315)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 24370
Average 0.235 0.055 0.013 0.303
(0.195-0.281) (0.043-0.067) (0.006-0.026) (0.260-0.350)
Prgs. First 0.272 0.017 0.013 0.303
(0.230-0.321) (0.010-0.026) (0.006-0.026) (0.260-0.350)
Schs. First 0.198 0.092 0.013 0.303
(0.158-0.245) (0.071-0.115) (0.006-0.026) (0.260-0.350)
Table B.19: Relative-Importance: Professional Programs (No Dentistry) and Combined Genders
Order
Regressors
Prg. Sch. Prg. × Sch. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 84160
Average 0.157 0.054 0.006 0.218
(0.148–0.167) (0.048–0.061) (0.004–0.009) (0.207–0.230)
Prgs. First 0.186 0.025 0.006 0.218
(0.176–0.197) (0.020–0.031) (0.004–0.009) (0.207–0.230)
Schs. First 0.128 0.083 0.006 0.218
(0.119–0.138) (0.074–0.092) (0.004–0.009) (0.207–0.230)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 90915
Average 0.162 0.055 0.006 0.223
(0.152–0.172) (0.049–0.060) (0.004–0.009) (0.211–0.235)
Prgs. First 0.190 0.027 0.006 0.223
(0.179–0.202) (0.022–0.032) (0.004–0.009) (0.211–0.235)
Sch. First 0.134 0.083 0.006 0.223
(0.124–0.144) (0.075–0.091) (0.004–0.009) (0.211–0.235)
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Table B.20: Relative-Importance: Professional Programs (No Dentistry) and Female
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 61850
Average 0.137 0.054 0.007 0.198
(0.128–0.147) (0.048–0.061) (0.004–0.010) (0.186–0.211)
Prgs. First 0.165 0.026 0.007 0.198
(0.154–0.177) (0.021–0.032) (0.004–0.010) (0.186–0.211)
Schs. First 0.109 0.082 0.007 0.198
(0.100–0.119) (0.073–0.092) (0.004–0.010) (0.186–0.211)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 66860
Average 0.139 0.058 0.007 0.205
(0.129–0.150) (0.052–0.065) (0.004–0.012) (0.193–0.219)
Prgs. First 0.165 0.032 0.007 0.205
(0.154–0.178) (0.026–0.039) (0.004–0.012) (0.193–0.219)
Schs. First 0.113 0.084 0.007 0.205
(0.103–0.124) (0.076–0.093) (0.004–0.012) (0.193–0.219)
Table B.21: Relative-Importance: Professional Programs (No Dentistry) and Male
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 22310
Average 0.175 0.060 0.009 0.243
(0.154–0.196) (0.048–0.073) (0.004–0.015) (0.218–0.268)
Prgs. First 0.206 0.029 0.009 0.243
(0.182–0.230) (0.019–0.041) (0.004–0.015) (0.218–0.268)
Schs. First 0.144 0.091 0.009 0.243
(0.124–0.164) (0.074–0.110) (0.004–0.015) (0.218–0.268)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 24055
Average 0.186 0.055 0.011 0.252
(0.165–0.209) (0.042–0.069) (0.006–0.018) (0.224–0.282)
Prgs. First 0.222 0.019 0.011 0.252
(0.195–0.250) (0.012–0.028) (0.006–0.018) (0.224–0.282)
Schs. First 0.151 0.090 0.011 0.252
(0.130–0.173) (0.068–0.116) (0.006–0.018) (0.224–0.282)
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Table B.22: Relative-Importance: Undergraduate Programs and Combined Genders
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 414725
Average 0.215 0.026 0.029 0.270
(0.210–0.220) (0.024–0.028) (0.026–0.032) (0.265–0.276)
Prgs. First 0.229 0.013 0.029 0.270
(0.224–0.234) (0.011–0.015) (0.026–0.032) (0.265–0.276)
Schs. First 0.202 0.040 0.029 0.270
(0.197–0.207) (0.037–0.043) (0.026–0.032) (0.265–0.276)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 462820
Average 0.178 0.022 0.024 0.223
(0.173–0.182) (0.020–0.023) (0.021–0.026) (0.218–0.228)
Prgs. First 0.189 0.010 0.024 0.223
(0.185–0.194) (0.009–0.012) (0.021–0.026) (0.218–0.228)
Schs. First 0.167 0.033 0.024 0.223
(0.162–0.171) (0.030–0.035) (0.021–0.026) (0.218–0.228)
Table B.23: Relative-Importance: Undergraduate Programs and Female
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 265010
Average 0.207 0.027 0.032 0.266
(0.201–0.212) (0.025–0.030) (0.029–0.036) (0.259–0.273)
Prg. First 0.219 0.015 0.032 0.266
(0.213–0.225) (0.013–0.017) (0.029–0.036) (0.259–0.273)
Sch. First 0.194 0.040 0.032 0.266
(0.189–0.200) (0.037–0.043) (0.029–0.036) (0.259–0.273)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 296645
Average 0.162 0.021 0.027 0.210
(0.157–0.167) (0.019–0.023) (0.024–0.030) (0.204–0.216)
Prgs. First 0.172 0.012 0.027 0.210
(0.166–0.177) (0.010–0.013) (0.024–0.030) (0.204–0.216)
Schs. First 0.153 0.030 0.027 0.210
(0.148–0.158) (0.028–0.033) (0.024–0.030) (0.204–0.216)
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Table B.24: Relative-Importance: Undergraduate Programs and Male
Order
Regressors
Prgs. Schs. Prgs. × Schs. Overall R2
Six-Month Salaries, N = 149715
Average 0.189 0.032 0.038 0.259
(0.181–0.199) (0.028–0.035) (0.032–0.046) (0.248–0.271)
Prgs. First 0.204 0.017 0.038 0.259
(0.195–0.213) (0.014–0.020) (0.032–0.046) (0.248–0.271)
Schs. First 0.175 0.046 0.038 0.259
(0.166–0.184) (0.041–0.051) (0.032–0.046) (0.248–0.271)
Two-Year Salaries, N = 166175
Average 0.161 0.025 0.034 0.221
(0.153–0.170) (0.022–0.029) (0.028–0.044) (0.210–0.233)
Prgs. First 0.173 0.014 0.034 0.221
(0.164–0.182) (0.011–0.016) (0.028–0.044) (0.210–0.233)
Schs. First 0.150 0.037 0.034 0.221
(0.141–0.159) (0.032–0.042) (0.028–0.044) (0.210–0.233)
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B.2.2 Estimated Salaries
Table B.25: Estimated Female Median Salaries by Professional Programs at Six Months and Two
Years
Programs
Period After Graduation
(2010 $) Median Salary (95 % C.I.) %∆(6 Mos N Sample1
6 Months 2 Years to 2 Yrs) 6 Mos 2 Yrs
Dentistry 93191 183899 97% 94 92
(67686–128765) (76524–815965)
Optometry 72677 90639 25% 143 143
(63827–82755) (83748–98097)
Veterinary Medicine 62017 65451 6% 222 214
(59360–64792) (62191–68881)
Medicine 53493 63628 19% 563 604
(50795–56463) (58336–70985)
Law 50570 60539 20% 1434 1469
(47121–54305) (56106–65373)
Education 28212 34085 21% 9962 10884
(teacher training) (27038–29442) (32834–35388)
Theology 24126 23634 -2% 46 58
(15685–37613) (17480–33666)
1The N sample refers to the number of employed graduates and, as a result of privacy suppression, it is
calculated as the midpoint between minimum and maximum possible number of employed individuals (the
same note also applies to Tables B.26 to B.28).
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Table B.26: Estimated Female Median Salaries by Undergraduate Programs at Six Months and Two
Years
Programs
Period After Graduation
(2010 $) Median Salary (95 % C.I.) %∆(6 Mos N Sample
6 Months 2 Years to 2 Yrs) 6 Mos 2 Yrs
Pharmacy 74637 83086 11% 417 421
(69953–79648) (79234–87134)
Nursing 52731 55065 4% 5189 5445
(50930–54606) (53293–56905)
Engineering 46518 51647 11% 1447 1656
(42966–50485) (47868–55878)
Computer Science 51197 57572 12% 160 189
(44713–59243) (51152–64921)
Therapy and Rehab. 44154 48454 10% 88 89
(40936–47625) (44514–52743)
Mathematics 39853 44172 11% 480 642
(35629–45631) (39763–49482)
Business/Commerce 38292 44736 17% 7218 7688
(36717–39957) (42973–46590)
Forestry – – – 0 0
Health Professions 34804 38827 12% 1536 1720
(31387–38732) (35444–42624)
Other Arts and Science 27786 31922 15% 2170 2389
(24950–31097) (28887–35375)
Archit. & Lands. Archit. 29104 28682 -1% 214 184
(25227–33686) (22615–37236)
Physical Sciences 25271 26863 6% 358 494
(19576–32877) (21598–33550)
Journalism 26521 33499 26% 316 355
(23609–30231) (30549–36772)
Social Sciences 24495 29574 21% 16421 18485
(23484–25563) (28459–30742)
Agr. & Bio. Sciences 21943 27286 24% 3222 3551
(19990–24177) (24868–30027)
Food Science/Nutrition 22193 29975 35% 818 1027
(20176–24670) (27555–32880)
Kin./Recr./Phys. Ed. 21800 28263 30% 2226 2504
(19490–24445) (25463–31407)
Humanities 21543 26726 24% 7894 9215
(20284–22909) (25331–28225)
Fine and Applied Arts 19024 22788 20% 2828 3275
(17299–21020) (20648–25294)
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Table B.27: Estimated Male Median Salaries by Undergraduate Programs at Six Months and Two
Years
Programs
Period After Graduation
(2010 $) Median Salary (95 % C.I.) %∆(6 Mos N Sample
6 Months 2 Years to 2 Yrs) 6 Mos 2 Yrs
Pharmacy 79346 89201 12% 171 177
(69204–91169) (79593–99968)
Nursing 53420 56747 6% 359 368
(46988–60786) (49633–65311)
Engineering 50560 56524 12% 6058 6883
(48686–52528) (54608–58596)
Computer Science 47662 54067 13% 1527 1680
(43597–52289) (49490–59281)
Therapy and Rehab. 50497 63060 25% 8 6
(41860–60917) (50742–78369)
Mathematics 41508 48061 16% 609 743
(37803–46124) (44001–52884)
Business/Commerce 41893 48811 17% 6840 7448
(39972–43931) (46682–51059)
Forestry 35957 41901 17% 20 25
(29454–43896) (35301–49735)
Health Professions 31581 36911 17% 332 386
(25796–38755) (30837–44498)
Other Arts and Science 40966 43454 6% 1174 1255
(35094–48293) (36996–51590)
Archit. & Lands. Archit. 31665 35449 12% 188 135
(26690–37905) (30452–44527)
Physical Sciences 28830 31570 10% 340 382
(22536–37174) (24779–40472)
Journalism 24320 31539 30% 29 38
(17278–34457) (24311–40920)
Social Sciences 30069 36081 20% 6045 6776
(28051–32264) (33828–38509)
Agr. & Bio. Sciences 26132 30997 19% 1355 1476
(22699–30306) (26901–35916)
Food Science/Nutrition 30156 32644 8% 66 77
(26643–34131) (28035–38010)
Kin./Recr./Phys. Ed. 24658 31114 26% 982 1115
(20915–29232) (26979–36018)
Humanities 23419 28409 21% 2878 3241
(20870–26412) (25548–31684)
Fine and Applied Arts 22310 26465 19% 962 1024
(18753–27152) (22403–31881)
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Table B.28: Estimated Male Median Salaries by Professional Programs at Six Months and Two
Years
Programs
Period After Graduation
(2010 $) Median Salary (95 % C.I.) %∆(6 Mos N Sample
6 Months 2 Years to 2 Yrs) 6 Mos 2 Yrs
Dentistry 131517 224595 71% 69 63
(77010–247252) (97654–516728)
Optometry 103450 143659 39% 45 45
(83513–128148) (97625–211401)
Veterinary Medicine 74230 82918 12% 31 24
(63025–87428) (70793–97119)
Medicine 55047 63532 15% 443 465
(52068–58279) (58382–69770)
Law 58014 71013 22% 1053 1066
(53061–63458) (64608–78095)
Education 34843 40336 16% 2853 3167
(teacher training) (32422–37475) (37830–43033)
Theology 32065 38348 20% 37 44
(24019–44467) (30217–49018)
B.2.3 Employment Rates
The employment rate calculation is as follows:
Employment Rate =
TOTEMP
TOTLF
=
EMP + OE
EMP + OE + NE
Where TOTEMP is the total employed and TOTLF is the labour force. EMP is the num-
ber of employed graduates, OE is the number of graduates that were offered employment at
a later date, and NE is the number of graduates who were not employed but were looking
for employment and were not in school.2
The calculation of the employment rates has to incorporate the missing data due to
privacy suppression. OE and NE have many suppressed observations, and EMP by the
data cleaning procedure have no missing observations.3 Although I do not know the exact
2All these variables are dependent on the school, program, graduating year, and gender; however, for
simplification, this is omitted from the notation.
3Refer to B.1.1 in the appendix for more details.
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values which are suppressed, by privacy suppression rules, they must be between 1 and 5.
Therefore, for the employment rates which involve suppressed values, there is a minimum
and maximum employment rate. The minimum employment rate has to have the smallest
numerator and the largest denominator, and the maximum employment rate has to have the
largest numerator and the smallest denominator.
Minimum Employment Rate =
EMP + 1
EMP + 1 + 5
Maximum Employment Rate =
EMP + 5
EMP + 5 + 1
Tables B.29 and B.30 in Section 3.4.2 report the midpoint employment rate.
Midpoint Employment Rate =
EMP + 3
EMP + 6
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Table B.29: Employment Rates by Undergraduate Programs and Gender at Six Months and Two
Years
Programs
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Pharmacy 95% 97% 92% 96% 97% 94%
Nursing 93% 94% 88% 98% 98% 95%
Engineering 87% 86% 88% 94% 91% 94%
Computer Science 89% 89% 89% 95% 97% 95%
Therapy & Rehab. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Mathematics 85% 89% 82% 91% 92% 91%
Business & Commerce 90% 92% 88% 95% 96% 94%
Forestry 100% - 100% 100% - 100%
Health Professions 86% 87% 80% 92% 93% 85%
Other Arts & Science 88% 88% 86% 91% 92% 91%
Archit. & Lands. Archit. 85% 83% 88% 86% 86% 87%
Physical Sciences 83% 85% 82% 85% 87% 82%
Journalism 87% 87% 84% 92% 91% 100%
Social Sciences 87% 88% 84% 92% 92% 90%
Agr. & Bio. Sciences 85% 86% 82% 90% 90% 90%
Food Science & Nutrition 89% 90% 81% 92% 92% 90%
Kin./Recr./Phys. Ed 90% 92% 87% 92% 92% 90%
Humanities 88% 90% 85% 92% 92% 90%
Fine & Applied Arts 86% 86% 86% 91% 91% 89%
Weighted Average 88% 89% 86% 93% 93% 92%
Table B.30: Employment Rates by Professional Programs and Gender at Six Months and Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Dentistry 98% 97% 100% 96% 94% 100%
Optometry 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 100%
Veterinary Medicine 97% 96% 100% 99% 99% 100%
Medicine 99% 99% 99% 98% 99% 96%
Law 92% 93% 92% 92% 92% 92%
Education (teacher training) 89% 89% 86% 95% 95% 93%
Theology 79% 77% 82% 90% 91% 89%
Weighted Average 90% 90% 89% 95% 95% 93%
123
APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
B.2.4 The Proportion of Survey Respondents That Acquired Jobs
The proportion of survey respondents that acquired jobs, denoted as EMPSURV, is similar
to the employment rate in Section B.2.3 but also considers the graduates that were not in
the labour force. The calculation is as follows:
EMPSURV =
TOTEMP
NUMS UR
=
EMP + OE
NUMS UR
Similarly to employment rate calculations in Section B.2.3, missing data due to privacy
suppression has to incorporated here as well. The method is analogous to Section B.2.3.
Minimum EMPSURV =
EMP + 1
NUMS UR
Maximum EMPSURV =
EMP + 5
NUMS UR
Midpoint EMPSURV =
EMP + 3
NUMS UR
124
APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
Table B.31: The Proportion of Survey Respondents that Acquired Jobs by Undergraduate Programs
and Gender at Six Months and Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Pharmacy 93% 94% 90% 95% 95% 94%
Nursing 91% 91% 90% 95% 95% 94%
Engineering 73% 70% 74% 83% 80% 84%
Computer Science 84% 83% 84% 91% 92% 91%
Therapy & Rehab. 97% 97% 100% 96% 98% 75%
Mathematics 71% 74% 68% 82% 85% 80%
Business & Commerce 84% 85% 82% 90% 91% 90%
Forestry 95% – 95% 91% – 91%
Health Professions 50% 54% 39% 56% 60% 43%
Other Arts & Science 68% 67% 68% 74% 74% 74%
Archit. & Lands. Archit. 76% 71% 81% 77% 73% 82%
Physical Sciences 59% 62% 56% 66% 70% 62%
Journalism 79% 79% 83% 88% 87% 93%
Social Sciences 68% 68% 67% 77% 77% 75%
Agr. & Bio. Sciences 48% 48% 46% 52% 53% 49%
Food Science & Nutrition 63% 62% 77% 78% 78% 82%
Kin./Recr./Phys. Ed 60% 60% 61% 68% 67% 68%
Humanities 67% 67% 66% 77% 78% 74%
Fine & Applied Arts 73% 72% 79% 82% 81% 82%
Weighted Average 70% 69% 70% 77% 77% 78%
Notes: Due to data suppression, the values in the table are midpoint imputations from
the calculated minimum to maximum interval. The average is weighted by the number
of survey respondents. The part-time rate calculations in Tables B.33 to B.35 used a
similar midpoint rule.
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Table B.32: The Proportion of Survey Respondents that Acquired Jobs by Professional Programs
and Gender at Six Months and Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Dentistry 92% 90% 93% 90% 88% 93%
Optometry 99% 98% 100% 99% 99% 100%
Veterinary Medicine 97% 97% 100% 94% 93% 96%
Medicine 87% 86% 89% 91% 90% 92%
Law 86% 85% 88% 89% 88% 89%
Education (teacher training) 83% 83% 82% 91% 91% 91%
Theology 73% 65% 86% 84% 82% 86%
Weighted Average 84% 84% 84% 90% 90% 91%
B.2.5 Estimated Part-Time Rates By Programs and Degree Type
Table B.33: Summary of Part-Time Rates by Degree Type and Gender at Six Months and Two Years
Degree Type
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Combined 21% 24% 14% 21% 24% 14%
Undergraduate 20% 24% 14% 20% 24% 14%
Professional 24% 26% 17% 24% 26% 17%
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Table B.34: Estimated Part-Time Rates by Undergraduate Programs and Gender at Six Months and
Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Pharmacy 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6%
Nursing 12% 12% 13% 12% 12% 13%
Engineering 5% 6% 5% 5% 7% 5%
Computer Science 6% 6% 6% 8% 6% 8%
Therapy and Rehab. 7% 7% 0% 7% 8% 0%
Mathematics 12% 12% 11% 14% 16% 13%
Business/Commerce 7% 8% 7% 8% 8% 7%
Forestry 10% 0% 10% 9% 0% 9%
Health Professions 25% 25% 24% 25% 25% 26%
Other Arts and Science 21% 25% 13% 21% 25% 13%
Archit. & Lands. Archit. 11% 11% 11% 9% 9% 9%
Physical Sciences 23% 23% 23% 26% 28% 24%
Journalism 19% 18% 28% 20% 19% 31%
Social Sciences 27% 29% 20% 27% 29% 20%
Agr. & Bio. Sciences 26% 27% 23% 26% 27% 22%
Food Science/Nutrition 32% 33% 12% 32% 33% 12%
Kin./Recr./Phys. Ed. 27% 27% 26% 27% 27% 28%
Humanities 31% 32% 28% 31% 32% 28%
Fine and Applied Arts 32% 34% 28% 32% 34% 28%
Weighted Average 20% 24% 14% 20% 24% 14%
Table B.35: Estimated Part-Time Rates by Professional Programs and Gender at Six Months and
Two Years
Programs
Period After Graduation and Gender
6 Months 2 Years
Combined
Genders
Female Male Combined
Genders
Female Male
Dentistry 11% 14% 8% 12% 13% 11%
Optometry 13% 12% 17% 13% 12% 17%
Veterinary Medicine 2% 3% 0% 3% 4% 0%
Medicine 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 4%
Law 5% 6% 4% 5% 5% 4%
Education (teacher training) 30% 32% 24% 30% 32% 24%
Theology 28% 32% 24% 28% 33% 23%
Weighted Average 24% 26% 17% 24% 26% 17%
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Chapter 4 Appendix
C.1 Identification: A Simple Two-Bin Example
The initial bins contain the salaries of full-time public-school teachers and the salaries of
education-program graduates who acquired a position outside the public school system
(the outside option). The goal of this procedure is to estimate the number of public-sector
teachers within each salary bin and then to subtract them out to reveal the number of people
who acquired a job outside the public school system. Once the new bins have been con-
structed, the salary distributions for the outside-option individuals can be estimated using
the maximum likelihood method.
Let x1 be the range of salaries in bin 1, x2 be the range of salaries in bin 2 and N be the
total number of individuals in the survey. A fraction αN, where α < 0, of these individuals
will have a job, either as a public-school teacher or through the outside option. Then
N∗ = αN = N1 + N2
where N1 and N2 represent the numbers of individuals who have a job in bins 1 and 2
respectively. Each of these bins contains the number of individuals N1,T , N2,T who receive
a teacher salary and the number of individuals N1,O, N2,O who receive an the outside-option
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salary. It therefore follows that
N1 = N1,T + N1,O, N2 = N2,T + N2,O.
The goal is then to estimate,
N1,O = N1−N1,T
N2,O = N2−N2,T .
Furthermore, I assume that individuals have one of two types of qualifications A1 and A2
(there are four types in the actual data), each of which has a different and known salary dis-
tribution that is conditional on having a public-school position. The number of individuals
of each type then can be represented by NT,A1 and NT,A2.
The following probabilities can be directly extracted from the data and are defined in
such a way as to correspond with the above-stated definitions:
p(T,A1) =
NT,A1
N
, p(TC,A2) =
NT,A2
N︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
Teacher Data
,
p(x1|T,A1) =
N1,T
NT,A1
, p(x2|TC,A2) =
N2,T
NT,A2︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸
S alary Grid Data
.
Then the following calculations are used to estimate N1,T and N2,T :
p(x1,T,A1) = p(x1|T,A1)p(T,A1) =
N1,T
NT,A1
NT,A1
N
=
N1,T
N
,
p(x2,T,A2) = p(x2|T,A2)p(T,A2) =
N2,T
NT,A2
NTC,A2
N
=
N2,T
N
.
After rearranging and solving for N1,O = N1−N1,T and N2,O = N2−N2,T :
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N1,O = N1−N p(x1,T,A1),
N2,O = N2−N p(x2,T,A2).
C.2 Data Details
C.2.1 Timing Information
I assume that the teacher job market is in discrete time. Further, I assume that teachers
graduate from teachers’ college between April and June of their graduation year, and that
they acquire their full-time position before September of that year. For example, for the
two-year data, if the individual graduated in 2007, then the period in question that indicates
whether he had a public-school teaching job would fall between April and June of 2009.
Moreover, if this individual was hired for a full-time teaching position, he would have to
have received it by September of 2008; therefore, for the calculation requirements of this
study, the 2008 salary grid would be used.
C.2.2 Teacher Data
Table C.1 reports the number of graduates in each graduating-year cohort who acquired a
teaching ceritifcation in 2014. Similarly to Chapter 1, since data for 2014 was only partially
downloaded, I excluded all graduates who acquired a teaching certification in 2014. For
example, the exclusion of 1,028 individuals from the 2013 cohort partially explains the
decrease in the number of graduates from the 2012 cohort to the 2013 cohort in Table
4.2. Moreover, the decrease in graduates for 2012 and 2013 is also due to the decrease in
Ontario teachers’ college enrolments for those cohort years. For example, the number of
graduates in 2013 is lower relative to the number of graduates in 2012 due to a 7.6 percent
drop in confirmed enrolments from 2011 to 2012 (OUAC, 2012) Likewise, the number of
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Table C.1: Excluded Observations from the 2014 Certification Year by Graduating-Year Cohort
Year Sample N
2007 10
2008 7
2009 19
2010 38
2011 74
2012 254
2013 1028
2014 5008
Total 6438
graduates in 2012 is lower relative to the number of graduates in 2011 due to a 6.4 percent
drop in confirmed enrolments from 2010 to 2011 (OUAC, 2011).
C.2.3 Inflation Adjusted Bins
Table C.2: Bin Adjustments for Inflation
Year 6 Months 2 Years
2007 1.044763 1.017437
2008 1.009516 1.000000
2009 1.017437 0.970075
2010 1.000000 0.958128
2011 0.970075 0.948010
2012 0.958128 0.928401
2013 0.948010 0.916732
Notes: The year refers to the graduating cohort. Everything was adjusted to 2010 dollars (August CPI).
Source: BOC (2019).
C.2.4 Salary-Grid Data Assumption Notes
Several assumptions were made in relation to missing collective agreements. The summary
of these assumptions along with the percentage of the observations that were affected are
outlined in Table C.3.
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Table C.3: Summary of Salary-Grid Assumptions
Assumption Description Percentage of Observations
No assumptions were needed because all of the
values were extracted from the salary grids.
79.55%
There was a wage freeze from 2012 to 2014.
The same values were used.
11.86%
If the first and last known years had the same
salary-grid values, then the years in between
also had the same values.
7.08%
I used the grid of another collective agreement
matched from the same union.
1.15%
The values were imputed through the use of
similar salary grids, based on the criterion that
the same grid values were observed in another
year. For example, if two different school
boards had the same values in a year when both
salary grids were observed, then they should
have the same values in all other years.
0.34%
Teachers under the ETFO union did not have a
wage freeze for 2013. I assumed the same
percentage change from the 2013 and the 2014
salary grids based on the other observed ETFO
salary grids.
0.02%
All of the values in the same salary grid
increase by the same percentage as in another
year. Therefore, one only needs one value in
order to calculate the percentage increase; this
percentage can be applied to all of the other
values in the grid. The values were found in a
summary document that includes the
maximum and minimum salaries for each
qualification category level.
0.01%
C.2.5 OUGS Data
Table C.4 shows the number of bins from which data were missing due to privacy sup-
pression. In Ontario, there is a relatively large number of teachers’ college graduates, and
therefore only a few bins were missing information; nevertheless, the vast majority had one
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or two suppressed bins for any group, with a maximum of three bins being suppressed.1 In
general, most of the missing information is at the right tail of the distribution; the data in-
clude part-time workers, and so the left tails have no bins with missing information. Refer
to Table C.5 for an example of the data format.
Table C.4: Number of Missing Bins Due to Privacy-Based Data Suppression
Female Male
Year 6 Months 2 Years 6 Months 2 Years
2007 2 1 2 2
2008 3 1 2 1
2009 3 1 3 1
2010 2 1 2 2
2011 1 0 0 0
2012 1 0 2 1
2013 0 0 2 0
Table C.5: Example of the OUGS Data Format for Programs (Fictional Data)
Demographic Variables
Obs. Graduation
Year
Program Gender Number of
Respondents
1 2007 Education Female 1304
2 2008 Education Male 507
(continued below)
Employment Outcome Variables: Six-Month Salary Bins (1-11) and Employment Status
Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
1 89 95 229 389 245 97 54 35 21 * * 1256 6 12 945 317
2 45 78 95 55 65 54 35 15 11 * * 454 7 14 391 70
Notes: The numbers in this table are fictional.
Survey Response Choices: Q1 – Employed, Q2 – Offered employment to start at a later date,
Q3 – Not employed and not in school, Q4 – Full-time and Q5 – Part-time.
1A group refers to a combination of gender, cohort and time since graduation. For example, 2008 females
six months after graduation comprise a single group.
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C.3 Robustness Results: Other Assumptions
Table C.6: Median Salaries: Assumption 1
A Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) B Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Six Months After Graduation: Female Six Months After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 29562 46532 37133 47363
(28632–30522) (46204–46741) (34955–39446) (47131–47806)
2008 26664 46648 34141 47391
(25774–27584) (46463–47103) (32147–36260) (47105–47865)
2009 25519 48279 31326 49152
(24710–26354) (47880–48430) (29628–33121) (48556–49625)
2010 26580 48875 31927 49699
(25777–27408) (48467–49036) (30287–33656) (49066–50295)
2011 25077 48836 30395 49719
(24312–25866) (48356–49040) (28748–32135) (49045–50197)
2012 23924 48234 29157 49081
(23227–24642) (47761–48436) (27697–30694) (48406–49794)
2013 23835 47725 28380 48500
(23181–24508) (47174–47983) (27016–29812) (47735–49511)
C Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) D Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Two Years After Graduation: Female Two Years After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 34978 47029 45664 47040
(33825–36171) (46596–47120) (43043–48445) (46158–47571)
2008 32390 47605 38937 47748
(31326–33490) (47213–48020) (36493–41546) (46954–48425)
2009 29781 47078 35344 47309
(28821–30774) (46692–47348) (33429–37369) (46473–47986)
2010 29473 47949 35065 47500
(28610–30361) (47501–48233) (33291–36933) (46999–48134)
2011 30375 48679 34142 49048
(29519–31257) (48193–49066) (32326–36060) (48109–49751)
2012 29435 48034 34373 48040
(28667–30222) (47408–48487) (32814–36005) (47106–49038)
2013 27473 46812 33921 46928
(26767–28198) (46514–47430) (32470–35436) (46207–48152)
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Table C.7: Median Salaries: Assumption 3
A Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) B Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Six Months After Graduation: Female Six Months After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 29546 47131 37645 47131
(28618–30504) (46746–47162) (35561–39852) (46677–47363)
2008 26639 47103 34628 47334
(25752–27556) (46716–47334) (32679–36692) (46878–47777)
2009 25486 48573 31599 49255
(24681–26318) (48366–48663) (29925–33368) (48660–49852)
2010 26510 49263 32136 49576
(25713–27331) (49085–49763) (30509–33850) (49020–50231)
2011 25038 49221 30611 49536
(24277–25823) (48979–49535) (28979–32336) (49010–50190)
2012 23873 48778 29348 48614
(23181–24586) (48614–49208) (27893–30880) (48095–49450)
2013 23815 42767 28115 48031
(23162–24486) (42271–42968) (26751–29548) (47117–48978)
C Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) D Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Two Years After Graduation: Female Two Years After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 34680 47741 45191 47893
(33548–35851) (47405–48038) (42607–47932) (47243–48483)
2008 32233 49037 38557 49023
(31182–33320) (48439–49609) (36155–41119) (48287–49762)
2009 29650 47986 35149 48610
(28700–30630) (47592–48431) (33249–37158) (47897–49511)
2010 29380 48870 34933 48774
(28524–30262) (48563–49452) (33177–36782) (48045–49536)
2011 30270 49780 34056 50397
(29420–31143) (49422–50397) (32253–35961) (49540–51313)
2012 29363 49111 34350 48891
(28600–30146) (48678–49734) (32796–35976) (47919–50149)
2013 27432 47544 33888 48097
(26729–28154) (47198–48109) (32442–35397) (46987–49377)
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Table C.8: Median Salaries: Assumption 4
A Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) B Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Six Months After Graduation: Female Six Months After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 29507 47363 38154 46532
(28581–30463) (47195–47363) (36159–40260) (46114–47116)
2008 26601 47391 35071 46627
(25718–27514) (47334–47799) (33162–37091) (46085–47149)
2009 25430 49152 32026 48279
(24630–26257) (48660–49409) (30351–33793) (47499–48660)
2010 26494 49760 32420 48860
(25699–27313) (49261–50019) (30796–34129) (48010–49261)
2011 24999 43977 30883 48836
(24242–25780) (43762–44156) (29252–32604) (48014–49221)
2012 23861 49107 29524 48234
(23170–24572) (48614–49431) (28071–31053) (47348–48727)
2013 23793 48588 28567 47693
(23142–24462) (48101–49047) (27205–29997) (46802–48433)
C Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.) D Median Salary 2010 CDN $: (95% C.I.)
Two Years After Graduation: Female Two Years After Graduation: Male
Year Outside Option Teaching Outside Option Teaching
2007 34461 47029 44922 47040
(33347–35612) (46596–47109) (42360–47640) (46192–47571)
2008 32044 47627 38548 47764
(31008–33115) (47260–48020) (36166–41087) (46982–48425)
2009 29550 47078 35088 47312
(28608–30523) (46692–47360) (33200–37084) (46502–47990)
2010 29315 47942 34842 47500
(28464–30191) (47501–48227) (33090–36686) (46999–48134)
2011 30213 48689 34019 49048
(29366–31084) (48193–49077) (32219–35919) (48109–49752)
2012 29334 48034 34290 48034
(28574–30115) (47408–48487) (32742–35911) (47106–49043)
2013 27399 46812 33854 46927
(26698–28118) (46514–47420) (32409–35363) (46231–48109)
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